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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Dynamics of Multinational Rivalry. (August 2003) 
 
Tieying Yu, B.S., Nankai University; 
M.S., Fudan University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. 
 
Drawing insights from strategic management and international business literature, 
the present study develops an integrated model to explain the competitive actions between 
multinational firms in a global context. Accordingly, two research questions are 
addressed: What key factors explain the competitive actions of multinational firms? What 
key factors moderate the competitive tensions experienced by different pairs of 
multinational firms? Using structured content analysis to identify competitive actions, the 
empirical findings of the present study suggest that subsidiary control, MNE size, national 
culture, government regulations and multimarket contact are all likely to exert important 
impact on a multinational firm’s motivation and capability to compete and therefore 
influence its competitive aggressiveness in foreign markets. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As more and more firms start to do business internationally, multinational rivalry1 
has naturally emerged as a field of interest among researchers in different disciplines 
(Ghoshal, 1987). Consequently, a large body of work has explored topics such as market 
entry (Buckley & Casson, 1998; Davis, Desai, & Francis, 2000), foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Graham, 1990; Knickerbocker, 1973) and technology diffusion (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Kim & Kogut, 1996) of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Despite 
the important insights provided by prior studies, our understanding of the competitive 
action of MNEs remains very limited.  
Focusing on the competitive actions of MNEs, the overriding objective of the 
present study is to develop a framework to understand multinational rivalry and conduct 
competitor analysis in an international context. The basic premise is that multinational 
rivalry can be best understood through studying the competitive actions of MNEs across 
national markets. This conceptualization offers researchers a concrete and manageable 
way to examine the complex phenomenon of global competition, moving beyond 
anecdotal and case-based explorations of this important topic (Chen & Stucker, 1997). 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Academy of Management Journal. 
1 In this dissertation, multinational rivalry, global competition, international competition 
and cross-border competition were used interchangeably. 
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Compared with domestic competition, the competitive interaction between MNEs 
is more complicated for several reasons. First, organizational considerations such as 
information availability and subsidiary control become more critical. Firms from different 
national cultures, for instance, might not be able to correctly interpret each other’s 
competitive signals. The headquarters of many MNEs might not have sufficient control 
over their local subsidiaries to execute corporate level competitive strategies (Martinez & 
Jarillo, 1989; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994).  
Second, market conditions across countries are different, in contrast to a more 
homogenous home market (Yip, 1995). Constraints on MNEs can be imposed by 
geographical distance, cultural diversity and varying government regulations (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991).  As a result, the critical elements of markets in a global setting are 
significantly different from those in a domestic market.  For instance, industrial 
concentration and entry barrier are two factors widely used by scholars to explain 
interfirm rivalry in a domestic competition. However, in a multinational context, these 
factors might not be sufficient to capture the  diverse market dynamics across country 
markets. Instead, cultural, economic and political characteristics associated with each 
national institutional environment become critical in shaping the competitive actions of 
MNEs. 
Finally, as noted by White and Eccles (1987:984), competition is a “tangible social 
construction” defined by the rivals involved. To identify who competes with whom, one 
must carefully investigate those contextual factors that allow these definitions to persist 
(Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995). When two firms compete 
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internationally, the change of environment may reshape their competitive relationship.  
For instance, Ford and General Motors are tit-for-tat competitors in the U.S. However, 
when they enter the Japanese market, the restrictions to which they are both subject are 
likely to motivate them to lower the competitive intensity against each other to certain 
degrees in order to get more bargaining power from the Japanese government.  
Recognizing the important differences between domestic and global competition, 
the basic motivation of this dissertation is to build an integrated model to understand 
multinational rivalry. In doing so, it is helpful to draw from extant research in the literature 
that not only examines oligopolistic competition in a global context (Buckley & Casson, 
1976; Dunning, 1981; Hennart, 1982), but also delves into the antecedents and 
consequences of interfirm rivalry (Chen, 1996; Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992).  
In strategic management, one research stream has significantly inspired the present 
study. Labeled competitive dynamics or the action-and-response perspective, some 
scholars using the individual competitive move as the unit of analysis investigate the 
characteristics of competitive action and response, their interaction, and their impacts on 
interfirm rivalry and organizational performance. The idea of competitive dynamics holds 
great promise for conceptualizing multinational rivalry. As Hamel and Prahalad 
(1985:140) note, “what drives global competition” is the exchange of competitive moves. 
Furthermore, competitive dynamics research has identified three drivers of interfirm 
rivalry—awareness, capability and motivation—which can be naturally applied to the 
analysis of global competition (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). The present study uses 
constructs such as subsidiary control, cultural distance and government regulations to 
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explain the competitive actions of MNEs, primarily because these factors exert a direct or 
indirect impact on an MNE’s motivation and capability to compete against its rival across 
markets.   
Despite its promising implications for multinational rivalry, competitive dynamics 
research suffers from one major limitation. With very few exceptions, “the market” 
examined is a homogeneous domestic market. The implicit assumption of market 
homogeneity and cultural commonality, which has been reinforced by studies that focus 
on highly homogeneous domestic industries, has greatly restricted the explanatory power 
of this research stream (Chen & Stucker, 1997).  
In addition to competitive dynamics research, strategic interaction theory in the 
international business literature has also contributed substantially to the theory 
development of this study. Strongly influenced by Industrial Organization Economics, the 
work in this stream argues that a firm’s decision to expand internationally (mainly in terms 
of FDI) depend both on its own capabilities and the behavior of its rivals. Emphasizing the 
competitive interdependence between multinational competitors, strategic interaction 
theory uses two models—exchange of threat and follow the leader—to explain 
oligopolistic rivalry across borders. Strategic interaction theory has provided great 
insights to the present research. However, due to its strong economics focus, strategic 
interaction theory has largely ignored firm-specific assets in understanding MNE foreign 
expansion.  
Since there remains a significant gap in both the strategic management and the 
international business literature, the need for developing a theory of multinational rivalry 
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is of paramount importance. Drawing insights from various theoretical perspectives, this 
dissertation extends previous competition study by addressing the following research 
question: 
What key factors explain the competitive actions of MNEs across national 
markets?  
Focusing on the differences between national markets as well as between 
competitors of different country origins (Porter, 1990), the present study investigates the 
antecedents of multinational rivalry. Consequently, some firm and market specific 
constructs such as subsidiary control, cultural distance and government regulations are 
suggested to have significant impacts on the competitive actions of multinational firms.  
First, from an organizational point of view, for MNEs operating in diverse national 
markets, an efficient coordination and control mechanism between different subsidiaries 
and between subsidiaries and headquarters is critical. For example, consider one 
multinational firm A competing in two foreign countries X and Y. Based on competition 
theory and strategic business unit (SBU) literature (Golden, 1992; Jayachandran, Gimeno, 
& Varadarajan, 1999), to effectively implement competitive strategy, firm A should make 
its administrative units in both country X and country Y willing and capable of 
coordinating their actions. In the absence of such intrafirm coordination, global 
competition converges to market-by-market competition, which might not be optimal for 
the overall firm performance. Most of previous research has ignored firm differences with 
respect to the implementation capability of competitive strategy. In the present study, 
however, using the equity holding structure as a way to capture the degree of control an 
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MNE headquarters has over its subsidiaries, the importance of subsidiary coordination 
and control in shaping an MNE’s competitive behavior is highlighted.   
Besides subsidiary control, national culture is expected to play a significant role in 
multinational rivalry as well. Despite its theoretical importance, the concept of cultural 
distance has not been applied to the study of competitive behavior. In filling this gap, the 
present research explains how cultural distance between rivals as well as between home 
and host markets are both key antecedents and moderators of MNE competitive actions. 
On the one hand, cultural similarity between two rivals helps them correctly interpret each 
other’s intentions and therefore increases their ability to undertake aggressive actions. On 
the other hand, when firms compete across countries, differences in national cultures lead 
to ambiguities in understanding and difficulties in transferring management practices 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). As a result, when an MNE competes in a country market 
culturally similar to its homeland, the easier and more effective resource and information 
flow between the headquarters and the subsidiary will increase the subsidiary’s capability 
to take competitive initiatives.  
Finally, from a market point of view, each national market has its own trade, 
economic and political idiosyncrasies that may shape the competitive action of MNEs 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987). Concentrating on government regulations on MNEs’ 
operation, the present study explores the role of the institutional environment in shaping 
multinational rivalry. Although previous research has already examined the effect of 
contextual factors such as industry dynamism on interfirm rivalry, as indicated earlier, 
there are important differences between the key elements of markets in domestic and 
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global settings. When firms compete internationally, they may use policy measures of 
their home governments as parts of their competitive strategies. Government protection 
offers home firms an opportunity to shape the competitive environment in such a way as to 
improve their position against foreign rivals. Moreover, a highly protected host 
environment is also likely to redefine the competitive relationships between two foreign 
rivals. Instead of competing aggressively, they may choose to reduce the competitive 
intensity against each other in order to have a stronger voice when negotiating with the 
host government.   
In addition to the first research question, the present study also investigates the 
competitive asymmetry between MNEs. Consequently, the first research question is 
extended as follows: 
What key factors moderate the competitive tensions experienced by 
different pairs of MNEs across national markets? 
Chen (1996) argued that, although all firms may compete simultaneously with 
each other in the same market, a firm will experience different degrees of competitive 
tension—the extent to which a focal firm would compete more aggressively with a given 
competitor—from each of its competitors. As an important topic for competitor analysis, 
competitive asymmetry, the notion that a given pair of firms may not pose an equal threat 
to each other, has attracted increasing attention from strategic management researchers. 
For instance, Gimeno (1999) found that a firm competed less aggressively with a rival 
which had an important foothold in the firm’s important markets.  Chen (1996) showed 
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that a firm competed more aggressively with a rival with similar resource endowment and 
common market profile. 
Despite all these interesting findings, little effort has been devoted to examining 
the competitive asymmetry in an international context. In contrast, the present study 
captures the asymmetric competitive dynamics existing between different pairs of MNEs 
through investigating factors that play important roles in global competition. For example, 
country of origin—as the key to carry out global research is identified as a critical 
moderator of pair wise competitive tensions between MNEs. The competitive dynamics 
between Toyota and Honda could be quite different from those between Toyota and 
Volvo. The cultural similarity may help Toyota and Honda clearly interpret each other’s 
competitive signals and therefore undertake fast competitive movements.  
CONTRIBUTION 
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the literature in the following three ways. 
First, it extends the study of competition in the game theory and strategic management 
literature by taking into account the important differences between domestic and global 
competition. In a multinational setting, cultural and geographic distance compounded by 
varying market contexts make the implicit assumptions of existing competition 
study---market homogeneity and cultural commonality--very problematic. Taking a 
multidisciplinary approach, the present study attempts to fill this gap by developing an 
integrated framework to explain the competitive action of MNEs. Theoretically and 
empirically, this research is one of the very few that have explicitly explored the impact of 
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government regulations, subsidiary control and cultural distance on firm competitive 
activity.  
Second, current research on multinational rivalry in the international business field 
has paid little attention to the varying competitive dynamics existing between different 
pairs of MNEs.  In the strategic management literature, although the idea of competitive 
asymmetry has generated significant interest from a small group of scholars, as indicated 
above, little of this interest has been extended to an international context. The present 
study on the other hand, refines previous research by examining the antecedents of 
asymmetric competitive relationships in global competition.  
Finally, by advancing the current literature of global competition from a collection 
of anecdotes to a multidisciplinary framework with rigorous data analysis and testing, the 
present study is one of the first empirical works on multinational rivalry in the strategic 
management field. Using structured content analysis to identify competitive moves 
between competitors, nine hypotheses are tested with a very rich database on the global 
automobile industry.  
Equally important, the present study retests theoretical arguments of existing 
competition research in a global setting. This not only helps us gain further understanding 
about the validity of these research streams, but also provides empirical evidence about 
the contingencies that might make previous theoretical predictions more or less likely to 
occur in a multinational context.  
 
 10
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHOD 
Theory and hypotheses developed in the present study were tested using a sample 
of 13 global auto manufacturers from 1995 through 2001. The selection of this research 
sample comes from both theoretical and pragmatic concerns. Theoretically, it is desirable 
to study competitive dynamics in an industry that has intense competitive interaction 
among an identifiable and manageable set of industrial participants. The oligopolistic 
market structure of the global automobile industry and its clearly defined industry 
boundary make it a good fit for the present study. Moreover, the 13 companies being 
selected by the present study jointly account for 88 percent of world motor vehicle 
production (Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, 2002), which indicates that the research 
sample well represents all the major players in the industry. Pragmatically, the time period 
chosen to study ensures the availability of data needed to test the theory and hypotheses 
suggested.  
Data were collected from various archival sources. The complete database 
includes information on competitive actions between MNEs, government regulations in 
different national markets, and some other firm and environmental characteristics. 
Consistent with previous research, the competitive actions of MNEs in different countries 
were identified using structured content analysis. A feasible generalized least squares 
regression analysis was employed to test the hypotheses generated from the theoretical 
framework of this study. 
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ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: relevant research 
streams about interfirm rivalry and global competition in game theory, strategic 
management and international business literatures are reviewed in Chapter II.  The chapter 
points out both contributions and limitations of previous research on multinational rivalry 
and sets the stage for the theoretical framework developed in Chapter III. In Chapter III, a 
theoretical model of multinational rivalry is developed. Six focal elements—subsidiary 
control, MNE size, cultural distance between competitors, cultural distance between home 
and host markets, government regulations and multimarket contact—are used to explain 
the competitive actions carried out by multinational rivals. In Chapter IV, based on the 
model suggested in Chapter III, nine hypotheses are developed. Chapter V presents the 
research methods used for hypothesis testing. Sample selection, measurement of variables 
and statistical analysis techniques are discussed. Research findings are provided in 
Chapter VI. Chapter VII presents discussion of the results reported in Chapter VI. 
Implications and limitations of this dissertation are deliberated, and future research 
directions are offered in the end.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The early work on multinational rivalry done primarily in the 1970s focused on the 
location choice and entry mode of FDI.  Scholars such as Kindleberger (1969), Caves 
(1971), Vernon (1971), Horst (1974), Knickerbocker (1973) and Graham (1978), simply 
viewed global competition as an extension of oligopolistic rivalry across borders. Strongly 
influenced by industrial organization economics, these researchers illustrated the 
dynamics of global competition using constructs such as entry barriers, competitive 
signaling and preemptive investment. The work of the early 1970s has laid a foundation 
for theory development of reciprocal dumping (Yu & Ito, 1988), strategic trade policy 
(Brander & Spencer, 1981; 1985; Krugman, 1987) and cross-subsidization (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1985). Although over decades, multinational rivalry has been widely recognized 
as important by researchers in different disciplines, the very few recent studies that have 
been conducted lack a clear examination of the interactive process of competition between 
MNEs (Enright, 1993; Waston, 1982). Therefore, much more remains to be done in 
building a theoretical framework to further investigate the driving forces of global 
competition.  
This chapter reviews relevant research streams about interfirm rivalry and global 
competition. In the first section, studies pertaining to interfirm rivalry in the game theory, 
competitive dynamics and multimarket competition literatures are discussed. In the 
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second section, theories and empirical evidence of the antecedents and consequences of 
global competition are reviewed.  
Overall, the objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the limitations of previous 
alternative theories and models vis-à-vis the present research. The chapter concludes by 
arguing that there is great promise in using well-established theory on interfirm rivalry to 
analyze global competition.  
INTERFIRM RIVALRY 
Research in Game Theory 
Competition has been a focal point of study for oligopoly theory in industrial 
organization economics. Focusing on competitive interaction, oligopoly theory uses 
mathematical models to denote equilibrium outcomes and payoffs associated with 
alternative actions and responses. Cournot (1838), Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1925) 
established the foundations of oligopoly theory and discussed the central issue of how 
prices would be formed in a market with only a few competitors. In doing so, they 
preceded non-cooperative game theory in developing solution concepts for situation of 
strategic interaction.  
It is precisely the interaction between game theory and oligopoly theory that made 
possible the formalization of important ideas about competition in industrial organization 
contexts. As the distinguished feature of “new industrial organization” economics, game 
theory has contributed important tools to research in different disciplines (Vives, 1999). 
Following lists a few models that are influential in the literature and a brief explanation of 
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some of these models can also be found in Table 2.1 (All tables and figures in this study 
appear in Appendix A).  
For dynamic games of complete information, subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE), 
a refinement of Nash equilibrium by Selten (1965) is central in game theory. For games of 
incomplete information, Harsanyi (1967) introduced the important concept of Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium (BNE). For dynamic games of incomplete information, Selten (1975)’s 
perfect equilibrium and Kreps and Wilson (1982b)’s sequential equilibrium are both very 
influential. With regard to the theory of repeated games pioneered by Friedman (1971), 
Aumann and Shapley (1976) provided important tools for analyzing the mechanisms to 
nourish collusion using credible threats. Finally, allowing for imperfect monitoring of 
firm actions, Green and Porter (1984) explained the role of price wars in sustaining 
collusion and the necessary condition to prevent secret price cutting. 
In general, research in game theory focuses on prescribing an optimal solution for 
a player from a set of action variables, with a basic premise that payoffs of various actions 
are interactive in nature. Put differently, a firm’s payoff or profit, for any given strategic 
choice, is jointly determined by its own actions and the actions of its competitors. In 
choosing among different strategic alternatives, a firm has to cautiously consider the 
likely future action of its rivals. At the same time, the firm’s action can also affect its 
rivals’ beliefs and corresponding return-maximizing behavior.  Hence, compared with 
most models in traditional industrial organization economics, game theory is more micro 
and dynamic by nature.  
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Game theory, as a language to describe strategic interaction, has been used to 
analyze many strategic issues. For instance, taking insights from the sequential 
equilibrium model developed by Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982),  Smith, Grimm and Cannon (1992) empirically examined the relationship between 
a firm’s reputation and the characteristics of its competitive response. Moreover, applying 
a game theory approach on market signaling to understanding competitors’ intentions and 
goals, Ferrier (1997) explored the impact of overt signaling (tough talk) on market share 
erosion. Although researchers in strategic management have devoted substantial effort to 
using game theory to explain many strategic issues, the work that has been conducted so 
far is still very limited. Several reasons might explain this situation.  
First, game theory emphasizes theoretical perfection, mathematical elegance and 
rigorous modeling. These goals have generally been achieved at the expense of the 
relevance of the business problems under study. For instance, Kreps (1990) noted that, 
many examples of competitive interaction are too rich and full of possible moves and 
countermoves to be modeled by game theory which requires very precise and simplified 
specification. 
Second, multiple equilibria are common in game theory models, and there is often 
no satisfactory way to choose a single equilibrium outcome. Achieving an equilibrium 
solution generally requires strong assumptions about players’ objectives and tendencies. 
However, players may quite rationally take very different courses of action which would 
not lead to an equilibrium (Kreps, 1990). 
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Third, most game theory research assumes players behave in a rational manner. 
However, in practice, strategies always emerge from a trial-and-error learning process in 
which players continuously adjust their choices based on past experience. In addition to 
perfect rationality, social norms, conventions and unique firm-specific factors are all 
likely to influence a firm’s strategic action. Although scholars in evolutionary game 
theory (Samuelson, 1997) and behavioral game theory (Camerer, 2001) have already 
begun to study these less-than-rational behaviors, much more remains to be done before 
these cutting-edge models can actually be applied to strategic management research.  
Research in Strategic Management 
Research in strategic management has also explored the issue of interfirm rivalry. 
Two major streams appear in the literature. The first —competitive dynamics—using the 
individual competitive move as the basic unit of analysis, investigates the characteristics 
of competitive action and response, their interaction and their impacts on interfirm rivalry 
and organizational performance. The second —multimarket competition—highlights the 
significance of shared market contacts in reducing competition intensity. Multimarket 
rivals can strategically use their mutual recognition of potential retaliation2 in various 
markets when formulating competitive strategy.  
Overview of Competitive Dynamics  
Schumpeter (1950)’s theory of “creative destruction” aptly describes head-to-head 
rivalry between firms as “an incessant race to get or to keep ahead of one another” 
                                                 
2 In this dissertation, retaliation and response were used interchangeably. 
 
 
 17
(Kirzner, 1973: 20). Especially in hyper-competitive markets, incumbent firms are 
relentlessly pursued by existing and unforeseen challengers that aggressively fight for 
competitive advantages in the marketplace (D'Aveni, 1994; Schumpeter, 1950). So, to 
stay ahead, the incumbent firms must actively find new ways of doing things and new 
things to do (Kirzner, 1973: 20). 
Building on this view of aggressive competitive interaction, researchers in the 
competitive dynamics literature have deliberately examined the active, energetic and 
primarily purposeful process by which firms interact with each other. MacMillan, 
McCaffrey and Van Wijk (1985) were the first to use an action-and-response perspective 
when they explored competitor’s responses to easily imitated new products in the banking 
industry. Bettis and Weeks (1987) employed a similar approach when investigating stock 
market reactions to product rivalry between Polaroid and Kodak in instant photography.  
In general,  researchers in the competitive dynamics stream have developed theory 
and empirical methods centering on a fine-grained competitor analysis at four distinct 
levels of analysis (a chronological overview of the major papers in competitive dynamics 
appears in Table 2.2). First, this group of work focuses on the individual action-response 
dyad (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992). Scholars  have investigated the antecedents of 
competitive action and response using factors such as the attributes a) of the action, b) of 
the actor, c) of the responder, and d) of the competitive environment (See Figure 2.1). 
Second, this stream of research has demonstrated a link between action and performance 
by aggregating the characteristics and frequency of specific action and response over a 
finite time period—the action-year (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Smith et al., 1992; 
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Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996) or action-month (Makadok, 1998). Research at this level 
of analysis has shown that the more actions a firm carried out and the greater the speed of 
execution, the better its profitability and market share. Third, in this research stream, 
strategy has been viewed as a sequence of competitive actions undertaken by a firm in a 
given year (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999). Accordingly, a firm’s competitive move 
was defined as an ordered, uninterrupted sequence of repeatable competitive action 
events. Fourth, research at this level of analysis has examined the type and timing of 
competitive actions and their influence on performance within a moving window of 
observation (Bettis & Weeks, 1987). Firms that responded quickly to new product 
introductions, for example, were in fact found to have stock market returns superior to 
new product first movers.  
Due to the dynamic nature of interfirm rivalry, an important task of competitive 
dynamics research has been identifying predictors of competitive attack and response. 
Various factors in the competitive dynamics literature have been used to explain the 
competitive exchange between firms. For instance, Chen and MacMillan (1992) used 
irreversibility of action and competitor dependence on the challenged market to predict 
rival firms’ response. Focusing on four characteristics of the initial action: competitive 
impact, attack intensity, implementation requirement and type of action, Chen, Smith and 
Grimm (1992) suggested that competitors’ responses were influenced by the 
characteristics of the action that evoked them. Furthermore, collecting data from three 
diverse industrial environments, Smith, Grimm and Gannon (1992) argued that variation 
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across industries influenced rivalry primarily through the manner in which competitive 
information was available to decision-makers. 
Among all the studies on competitive dynamics, Chen (1996) notably extended 
early research by analyzing the structural context before the launch of an attack. His 
contribution centers around two firm-specific constructs: market commonality developed 
from the multimarket competition literature and resource similarity derived from the 
resource-based theory of the firm. Each firm has a unique market profile and strategic 
resource endowment. A pair wise comparison with a given competitor along these two 
dimensions may help researchers illuminate the pre-battle competitive tensions between 
these two firms and predict how they will attack (or respond to) each other.  
In addition to studying the manner by which firms act and react in the marketplace, 
scholars have also examined the relationship between competitive action/response and 
firm performance. Two studies are worth noting here. Drawing from the Austrian school 
of economics, Young, Smith and Grimm (1996) presented a dynamic model of 
competitive activity and performance. They empirically explored the influence of industry 
level and firm level cooperative mechanisms on firm level competitive activity, and the 
effect of firm and industry level competitive activity on firm performance.  
In another study, Ferrier and Smith (1999) explored the extent to which 
dethronement and market share erosion are a function of competitive behaviors of 
industry leaders and their respective number two challengers. They used four 
characteristics of competitive action carried out by leaders and challengers to explain the 
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industry leader’s decline: total competitive activity, action timing, action repertoire 
simplicity and competitive dissimilarity.  
Theoretically, the action-and-response model suggested  by the competitive 
dynamics research provides a new angle to portray firms’ actual competitive behavior in 
the market place. Its firm specific, pair wise analysis of competitors is able to capture the 
dynamic interaction of firms as they strive for competitive advantages, because it is at this 
dyadic level where competitive engagement actually occurs (Chen & MacMillan, 1992) 
and the “mutual interdependence” of firms is best represented (Porter, 1980:17).  
Despite its promising implications, the competitive dynamics research is not 
without limitations. First, researchers have devoted attention only to competition in a 
domestic setting. The implicit assumption of market homogeneity and cultural similarity 
has significantly restricted its explanatory power in a global context.  
Second, although the firm level pair wise emphasis of competitive dynamics 
research represents a critical first step, its dyadic focus should be complemented by some 
group or structural approaches in which the social nature or the context of competition is 
considered. As noted by Chen (1996), these contextual (or industry) factors may not be 
very helpful in predicting which firms are more likely to initiate competitive actions or 
engage in responses, but they are surely helpful in specifying broad competitive 
parameters.  Especially in a global market, contextual factors such as government 
regulations and market diversity certainly could exert significant impacts on firm 
competitive behaviors. 
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Finally, the action-and-response model needs to be tested in more diverse industry 
settings. From Table 2.2, we can find that, except for very few studies, most of the work in 
competitive dynamics has been conducted on the U.S. airline industry. On the one hand, 
the U.S. domestic airline industry does possess some idiosyncratic features which make it 
an ideal setting for testing the proposed theory. On the other hand, heavily focusing on one 
industry affects the generalizability of this research stream.  
Overview of Multimarket Competition    
The fast growing literature on multimarket competition encompasses three 
disciplines: strategic management (Barnett, 1993; Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996; 
Gimeno, 1994; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Porter, 1980; Smith 
& Wilson, 1995; Witteloostuijn & Wegberg, 1992), industrial organization economics 
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Evans & Kessides, 1994; Feinberg, 1984; 
Feinberg, 1985; Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Mester, 1987; Scott, 1982) and international 
economics and business (Baer, 1984; Casson, 1987; Hamel & Prahalad, 1985; Hennart & 
Park, 1994; Knickerbocker, 1973; Pinto, 1986; Yu & Ito, 1988). Since early works 
pertaining to multimarket competition have already been extensively reviewed by some 
scholars (Chen & Stucker, 1997; Gimeno, 1994), the present study only focuses on the 
current multimarket competition research in the strategic management field(see Table 
2.3).  
Multimarket competition refers to competitive situations in which the same firms 
compete against each other simultaneously in multiple geographic/product markets. The 
theory of multimarket competition suggests that the multimarket contact gives a firm the 
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option to respond to an attack by a rival not only in the challenged market, but also in other 
markets in which they both compete. Mutual forbearance, a form of tacit collusion in 
which firms avoid competitive actions against those rivals they meet in multiple markets, 
is proposed to occur when multimarket contact increases interdependence between 
competitors and their ability to deter each other (Baum & Korn, 1996; Edwards, 1955; 
Gimeno, 1994; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985). Building on the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis, some researchers examine the effect of multimarket contact on competition 
intensity through changes in prices or profits. While others, drawing from population 
ecology and international business literatures, explore how the pattern of market entry 
behavior is constrained by mutual forbearance.  
The impact of multimarket contact on intensity of rivalry has received the most 
attention to date. Measuring competition intensity using marketing-related variables such 
as price cuts, advertisement expenditure or stability of market share (Gimeno & Woo, 
1996, 1999), researchers have empirically tested the competition-reduction effect of 
multimarket contact in a variety of settings. For instance, Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) 
found a negative relationship between rivalry and inter-market linkages for bank holding 
companies. Using panel data analysis, Evans and Kessides (1994) showed that in the US 
airline industry, the multimarket contact was closely associated with high prices 
(collusion). In addition to the competition-reduction effect of multimarket contact, 
researchers have also explored certain factors that may moderate the relationship between 
multimarket contact and interfirm rivalry. Such moderating variables are typically 
characteristics of a market environment. In the literature, asymmetric territory interests, 
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resource similarity, firm industrial experiences and inter-firm transfer of learning are all 
conditions posited to make mutual forbearance more likely to occur (Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 
1999; Greve, 2000; Ingram & Baum, 2001; Wegberg & Witteloostuijn, 2001).  
In addition to investigating the influence of multimarket contact on competitive 
intensity, some scholars drawing from population ecology have also examined the 
outcome of mutual forbearance in terms of market entry behavior. Among which, two 
papers written by Baum and Korn (1996; 1999) are noteworthy. Different from past 
research treating multimarket contact as an aggregate property of industries (Hughes & 
Oughton, 1993), markets (Evans & Kessides, 1994) or firms (Barnett, 1993; Gimeno & 
Woo, 1996), Baum and Korn (1999) argue that multimarket contact is a property of the 
relationship between two firms. They emphasize the cross-market nature of multimarket 
contact by studying the competitor-dyad level at which actual competitive engagement 
occurs (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). Moreover, in contrast to traditional theory which 
proposes a linear relationship between multimarket contact and interfirm rivalry, Baum 
and Korn (1996; 1999) hypothesized an inverted U-shaped relationship between levels of 
multimarket contact and the intensity of competitive interaction. When multimarket 
contact between two firms is low, each firm has an incentive to enter the same markets as 
the other in order to signal its ability to respond to an attack. However, as multimarket 
contact increases and firms recognize their competitive interdependence, they will avoid 
entering a new market that is currently occupied by rivals that they have already met in 
multiple markets.  
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As a quickly evolving research stream, some of the logic and mechanisms of 
multimarket competition theory could potentially be applied to the analysis of global 
competition. Despite its promising theoretical implications, multimarket competition 
theory has been criticized for the following limitations.  
First, there are many ways of defining markets. For instance, a geographic market 
can be defined as the lowest geographic unit in which a manager has decision-making 
authority over competitive strategies (Jayachandran et al., 1999). A product market can be 
a set of goods or services that is created by similar technology and serves similar functions 
and customers (Abell, 1980). Despite various definitions of market, in the multimarket 
competition literature, “the market” examined is mainly a homogenous domestic market. 
Thus, theoretically, it is imperative for scholars to extend multimarket competition 
research to other contexts, such as product-line, Internet and international rivalry.  
Second, multimarket competition research has focused primarily on the overall 
aggregate effects of mutual forbearance, with only limited effort to exploring the dynamic 
process in which competitors actually enact their strategies, signal their aggressiveness 
and defend their reputations via competitive actions and responses (Baum & Korn, 1999; 
Chen & MacMillan, 1992).  
Third, research in multimarket competition implicitly assumes that there is 
sufficient coordination between product/geographic markets within firms. Hence, by 
largely ignoring firm differences with respect to implementation capabilities of 
competitive strategy, researchers have not fully appreciated the scope and potential 
robustness of the mutual forbearance phenomenon (Golden & Ma, 2003). As noted by 
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Gimeno and Woo (1999), the appropriate coordination and control mechanisms among 
different organizational units managing activities in different geographic/product markets 
are critical for the effectiveness of multimarket strategies. Multimarket competition will 
lead to mutual forbearance and lower intensity of competition only if each firm achieves 
effective coordination between the administrative units through certain ownership 
structure or incentive systems.  
GLOBAL COMPETITION 
As more and more firms go global, a whole spectrum of tools and viewpoints from 
various disciplines has been used to examine international expansion of MNEs. Generally, 
the research in international business suggests that a firm’s decision to expand 
internationally (mainly in terms of FDI) depend both on its own capabilities and on the 
behavior of its rivals. Transaction cost theory focuses on firm specific assets in explaining 
the decisions to expand abroad and largely ignores strategic interactions between 
competing firms (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1981; Hennart, 1982). Conversely, 
strategic interaction theorists argue that a firm’s decision to engage in FDI hinges on the 
behavior or expected behavior of its rivals (Flowers, 1976; Graham, 1974; 1978; 
Knickerbocker, 1973). Strongly influenced by industrial organization economics, the 
impressive work of this stream has inspired enormous studies in strategic management 
and also contributes substantially to the theory development of the present study. Thus, in 
this section, first of all I want to review two major models in strategic interaction theory: 
exchange of threat and follow the leader. Given the oligopolistic setting that MNEs 
compete in, both models have explicitly explored how oligopolistic rivalry among MNEs 
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can affect market entry. Despite the insights that strategic interaction theory has brought to 
the literature, its strong economics focus makes it ignore firm level factors that may lead 
firms to invest abroad even in the absence of strategic imperatives. Recognizing this 
limitation, a small group of researchers have already begun to move the level of 
competitive analysis from industry to firm. These studies share a common interest with 
this dissertation on firm competitive interactions. So, I will briefly review them in the 
second part of this section.  
An Extension of Oligopolistic Rivalry across Borders  
According to strategic interaction theorists, international competition is simply an 
extension of oligopolistic rivalry across borders. The strategic rationale for FDI can be 
explained by two different types of behavior: 1) Exchange of threat, which emphasizes 
that the threat of reciprocal entry may make two MNEs with different country origins 
refrain from entering each other’s home markets; and 2) Follow the leader, which 
highlights the significance of a parallel international diversification pattern of MNEs from 
the same country.  
Exchange of Threat 
 This body of work assumes a two country, two player game, and depicts the 
conditions under which the threat of mutual invasion can stop firms from entering each 
other’s home markets (Brander & Krugman, 1983; Casson, 1987; Graham, 1990). The 
model of “exchange of threat” has evolved from studying one-shot games, in which 
cooperation always breaks down due to the prisoner’s dilemma (Brander & Krugman, 
1983), to studying repeated games, in which any gains from cheating can be offset by 
 
 27
future punishment and therefore a cooperative equilibrium is likely to be achieved 
(Graham, 1990; Pinto, 1986).  
The principle of “exchange of threat” underscores the importance of strategic 
interdependence in understanding competitive dynamics. Given the extensive research 
conducted in FDI, one might be surprised by the sparseness of studies in this research 
stream. Using a game theoretical approach, Graham (1998: 78) suggested that “if Firm B 
of Country B is able to achieve a positive profit by entering Country A, it has a positive 
incentive to do so if Firm A of Country A had previously entered its home market 
(Country B).” And this will hold true even when Firm B does not have any manufacturing 
or marketing cost advantages over Firm A.  
Along the same line, Veugelers (1995) presented a variant of the traditional two 
country, two player model, in which each firm must pre-commit to a sunk cost interpreted 
as an R&D cost in order to build advantages in international markets. Veugelers (1995) 
pinpointed situations in which oligopolistic reactions may dominate and possibly 
counteract the traditional motives for MNE operation such as location and firm specific 
advantages.  
Finally, Casson (1987) extended previous analysis by specifying the sophisticated 
rationalization behind cross-subsidization behavior. He noted that, confronting a 
technologically strong firm in a global market, a technologically weak firm although 
disadvantaged, is not entirely without power. The weak firm can defend itself, not in its 
home market being challenged, but through counteracting in the strong firm’s home 
market. The main advantage of cross-subsidization is that it increases the threat power of 
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the firm. However, when two firms are both able to cross-subsidize, any unilateral threat 
will unavoidably end in neutralization. As a result, firms have to choose essentially 
between tacit collusion and bilateral cross-subsidization.   
Empirically, the impact of  “exchange of threat” has received limited support in the 
literature. Graham (1974; 1978) examined whether European and Canadian FDI in the 
U.S. was a response to previous U.S. investment in Europe and Canada. He found positive 
evidence in industries characterized by high concentration, product differentiation and R 
& D intensity. However, Graham’s work was criticized for a time lag effect. Put aside 
competitive consideration, simply as an ideal place for FDI, the U.S. market had attracted 
an increasing number of European investors during the time period under study. Hence, 
the longer the time lag, the greater the correlation between U.S. investments in Europe and 
European FDI in the U.S., even in the absence of an exchange of threat effect (Hennart & 
Park, 1994).  
Except for Graham’s work, most of the other studies on “exchange of threat” are 
anecdotal. Watson (1982) reported the example of IBM and Texas Instruments, which 
moved early to establish product facilities in the Japanese mainframe computer and 
semiconductor industries to prevent Japanese manufacturers from dominating their 
markets. Consequently, Japanese companies such as Fujitsu were eager to expand abroad 
to increase economies of scale to fight with IBM back home. Tsurumi and Tsurumi (1999) 
used “exchange of threat” to explain Fuji film’s early entry into the U.S. market in 1958 
and Kodak’s takeover of Nagase in 1986 in Japan.  
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Overall, the model of “exchange of threat” has been criticized for lacking 
widespread empirical support. Although Graham (1978) did find that firms may respond 
to foreign entry by investing in the country of foreign entrants, his study did not provide 
evidence of the “exchange of threat” equilibrium, whereby firms mutually forbear from 
entering each other’s markets because of the expected response. In fact, as noted by 
Gimeno (1994) and Hennart and Park (1994), whether the threat of mutual invasion can 
stop competitors’ reciprocal entry or instead escalate interpenetration actually depends on 
many factors that have not been investigated in an “exchange of threat” model, such as the 
cost of entry, the irreversibility of entry and organizational ability to coordinate strategies 
globally.  
Follow the Leader  
The second research stream, which has been called “follow the leader”, originates 
at Harvard with the work of Knickerbocker (1973) in particular. Knickerbocker observed 
the tendency of U.S. multinationals to quickly imitate FDI movements of their 
competitors. His dissertation provides the theoretical underpinnings and empirical support 
for “follow the leader” behavior. Examining the activities of established subsidiaries of 
187 U. S. multinationals in 23 countries over 20 years, Knickerbocker found a significant 
relationship between industry concentration and the incumbents’ “bunching” behavior in 
foreign investment. Entry concentration increases with industry concentration up to a 
point, then declines. This supports his hypothesis:  “follow the leader” behavior should 
occur only in moderately concentrated industries, not unconcentrated ones or highly 
concentrated ones. The explanation is that tightly knit oligopolists will have more 
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incentive to collude instead of directly competing with each other. Only firms in loose 
oligopolistic industries are sensitive to their rivals’ moves and are motivated to react 
quickly to maintain their competitive parity.  
“Follow the leader” behavior was further explored by Baer (1984), who developed 
a formal model of sequential entry into foreign markets. His major explanatory variables 
are the number of firms in the industry, the ability of firms to coordinate their output 
decisions, and the degree of product differentiation. His study empirically showed that 
“follow the leader” behavior is a consequence of product differentiation, cost advantages 
and medium levels of collusion.  
In contrast to the model of “exchange of threat”, the “follow the leader” behavior 
has received more empirical support. In addition to Knickerbocker (1973), Flowers 
(1976), Baer (1984) and Encarnation (1987) reported the sequential entry patterns in the 
semiconductor industry. After NEC—the leading Japanese manufacturer initiated the first 
FDI into the U.S. market in 1978, Hitachi and Fujitsu moved in 1979 and Toshiba in 1980 
and Mitsubishi followed in 1983. Moreover, Yu and Ito (1988) empirically tested the 
influence of oligopolistic rivalry and some firm and host country related factors on FDI 
activities in the U.S. tire and textile industries. Their results revealed that in an 
oligopolistic industry, firms’ motivation of FDI is mainly based on the behavior of rivals, 
however in a very competitive industry, firms usually do not actively counter the 
competitors’ movements. Finally, Terpstra and Yu (1988) investigated the effect of 
oligopolistic reaction among the top ten and the second ten largest U.S. advertising 
agencies and they only found a strong “follow the leader” behavior for the first group.  
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In the literature, the “follow the leader” model was criticized for the following two 
reasons. First, both Knickerbocker (1973) and Flowers (1976) tested the existence of 
“follow the leader” behavior by measuring the extent to which foreign entry was clustered 
in time and regressing it on the concentration ratio of the investor’s industry. On the one 
hand, entry bunching measured by entry concentration index does not necessarily show 
oligopolistic reaction but simply indicates that all firms are faced with profitable 
investment opportunities at the same time. On the other hand, a positive relationship 
between industry concentration ratio and entry bunching may merely reflect the similarity 
of firms’ resources and capabilities, or the institutional tendency of firms to imitate each 
other (mimetic isomorphism) (Gimeno, 1994). The “follow the leader” model was also 
criticized for the fact that it did not address the reason why the first firm in an industry 
goes abroad. Finally, the model implies that the followers will follow the leader’s action 
without considering other factors, which in practice is not very realistic.  
Addition of Firm-specific Factors to Oligopolistic Rivalry  
Despite the insights that strategic interaction theory has contributed to global 
competition study, its strong industrial organization economics focus makes it ignore firm 
specific assets in understanding MNE foreign expansions. Recognizing this gap in the 
literature, a small group of researchers have started to use many firm level factors in 
studying multinational rivalry.  
For instance, Yu and Ito (1988) presented an empirical analysis of the impact of 
firm related and host country related factors on oligopolistic rivalry in the U.S. tire and 
textile industries. They found that the followers in an industry are not following the leader 
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just because the leader is in the market. Instead they make their decisions based on firm 
specific factors such as firm size, R&D knowledge and product related information. 
Similarly, another study conducted by Hennart and Park (1994) showed that the Japanese 
firms’ propensity to manufacture in the U.S. can be explained simultaneously by location, 
firm governance structure and strategic interactions.  
In addition to studies in international business, the promise of applying strategic 
interaction theory to analyzing interfirm rivalry has also attracted the attention of some 
strategic management scholars. First, Alcacer (2001) explored the effect of firm rivalry on 
location choice in oligopolistic industries under different firm behavioral assumptions and 
learning scenarios. There are three central predictions in his model. First, differences in 
firm capabilities (modeled as differences in marginal costs) cause differences in location 
choices. Second, more capable firms maintain more monopolistic positions since they 
deter competitors more easily and are not forced to exit markets when rivals enter. Finally, 
the impact of firm capabilities on location choice changes over time. Second, in an 
unpublished working paper, Gimeno, Loree and Beal (1999) examined the globalization 
of the integrated circuit industry using the lenses of multimarket competition theory. They 
suggest that a focal firm tends to mimic the international destination of home country 
rivals and foreign rivals that have competitive presence in its home market.  
Although researchers in different disciplines have all recognized the potential of 
studying multinational rivalry at the firm level, the very few studies that have been 
conducted so far lack a clear explanation of the competitive actions of MNEs (Chen & 
Stucker, 1997). Most of them are case studies or “international” only in the sense they 
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examined non-U.S. markets rather than competition across multiple national markets. 
Examples include Craig (1996)’s description of the Japanese beer war in the mid 80s and 
Doyle, Saunders and Wong (1992)’s study of the differences in competitive strategies 
among American, Japanese and British subsidiaries in the U.K. market. Since the 
literature has given relatively little attention to the development of a theoretical 
framework for understanding rivalry in an international setting, much more remains to be 
done in filling this gap.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature of interfirm rivalry and global 
competition in game theory, strategic management and international business. These 
theories have provided much insight to the analysis of multinational rivalry. However, 
they also suffer from their own limitations. For instance, research in international business 
depends heavily on industry structural factors and has failed to consider firm specific 
characteristics in explaining MNE foreign expansions. With regard to the study of 
competition in game theory and strategic management, although it is the most relevant to 
the present study, the implicit assumption of market homogeneity and cultural 
commonality has greatly restricted the explanatory power of this line of thinking.  
In sum, the diversity in the literature discussed in this chapter indicates that no 
single theory can effectively guide the course of the present study. In order to fill this gap, 
the purpose of this dissertation is to provide a theoretical framework to understand the 
competitive actions of MNEs, focusing on important organizational and environmental 
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characteristics such as subsidiary control, cultural distance and government regulations 
that have been largely ignored in domestic competition study.  
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CHAPTER III 
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF MULTINATIONAL RIVALRY 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for global 
competition using a variety of literatures to enrich and refine the study of interfirm rivalry. 
The basic premise is that multinational rivalry can be best understood through studying 
the competitive actions of MNEs across various national markets (Chen & Stucker, 1997). 
Two research questions are addressed : What key factors explain the competitive actions 
of MNEs across national markets? What key factors cause the asymmetric  competitive 
tensions between different pairs of MNEs? Combining insights from existing theoretical 
streams, I argue that strong subsidiary control, large MNE size, similar culture value 
between competitors as well as between home and host markets, favorable host 
government regulations, strong home government protections and less multimarket 
contact are all likely to increase an MNE’s motivation and capability to compete with its 
rivals and therefore increase its competitive aggressiveness in a given market.  In line with 
previous research, a market in this dissertation is defined by the geographic border of a 
country.  
This chapter is organized into two sections. Firstly I define competitive action and 
explain the two dimensions of competitive action being investigated in the present 
study—action volume and action complexity. Second, I develop an integrated model of 
multinational rivalry and explore the role of subsidiary control, size, national culture, 
multimarket contact and government regulations in shaping MNEs’ competitive action.  
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TWO DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITIVE ACTION  
Firms constantly undertake offensive and defensive actions in their struggle for 
competitive advantage. According to the perspective of Austrian economics, 
organizational action constitutes the critical market process in which frequent aggressive 
firm action disrupts causal linkages between competitive conduct and performance 
outcomes established in the market status quo. To have superior performance over time, 
firms must  undertake a series of actions to continuously create and recreate competitive 
advantage.  The study of competitive action is important because it captures the interactive 
market behavior between firms in their quest for  competitive positions in an industry 
(Caves, 1984; Porter, 1980).  
Consistent with previous research, the present study defines competitive action as 
a specific and detectable competitive move, such as a price cut or new product 
introduction, initiated by a firm to defend or improve its relative competitive position 
(Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991: 61). Moreover, as will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter V, I categorized competitive actions of MNEs into the following nine categories: 
pricing action, new product action, marketing action, technology innovation, capacity 
action, improvement in distribution and after sales service, diversification, international 
expansion and changes in organizational structure and management systems. Actions 
being selected by this research include major and less momentous types of decisions as 
both are essential aspects of most competitive arsenals. There was much overlap between 
the actions the present study chose and those selected by researchers such as Miler and 
Chen (1996) and Ferrier, Smith and Grimm (1999).  
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Given that individual actions comprise the basic building blocks for competitive 
exchanges between rivals, various dimensions of competitive action have been examined 
in the existing literature. For instance, Chen, Smith and Grimm (1992) investigated four 
dimensions of a firm’s competitive action: attack intensity, implementation requirements, 
competitive impact and type of action. Ferrier, Smith and Grimm (1999) examined the 
impact of four characteristics of competitive aggressiveness that relate to market erosion: 
total competitive activity, action timing, action repertoire simplicity and competitive 
dissimilarity.  
Despite various dimensions of competitive action that have been explored by prior 
research, the present study only focuses on two of them—action volume and action 
complexity. Several factors guide this selection, with the most critical being the particular 
relevance of these two dimensions to firm competitive aggressiveness and performance. 
Using total competitive activity to measure the aggressiveness of a firm, Young, Smith 
and Grimm (1996) observed a positive relationship between a firm’s total competitive 
actions and its performance. Ferrier, Smith and Grimm (1999) echoed Young et al.'s 
conclusions and showed that market leaders are more likely to experience market share 
erosion when—relative to challengers—they undertook less competitive moves and 
carried out simpler repertoires of actions. Together, these studies suggest that action 
volume and action complexity, as two critical dimensions of competitive action, highlight 
the differences that are theoretically important to capture a firm’s competitive 
aggressiveness. In the following section, I will discuss these two dimensions in turn.  
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Action Volume 
 Action volume is defined as  the total number of competitive actions a firm takes 
in a given country market each year. In general, the greater the number of competitive 
actions, the greater the competitive aggressiveness (D'Aveni, 1994; Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Young et al., 1996). Competitive dynamics and Austrian economics suggest that 
opportunity for profit is the most important incentive for a firm to undertake competitive 
action (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Kirzner, 1997; Schumpeter, 1934). A firm that is 
aggressive in carrying out more competitive actions than rivals will be exploiting more 
opportunities and closing off the potential for rivals to retaliate. The positive relationship 
between action volume and organizational performance is empirically supported in the 
literature. For instance, studying a sample of 1,903 competitive moves undertaken over a 
nine-year period in the US software industry, Young, Smith and Grimm (1996) found that 
the firm that undertakes more actions generates a higher level of performance. Similarly, 
Ferrier, Smith and Grimm (1999) have shown that the difference between market leaders 
and challengers in their levels of total competitive activity is related to the persistence of 
market leadership. 
As a firm’s cumulative competitive activities increase, the firm creates internal 
organizational assets in the form of skills, routines and knowledge as well as external 
assets that cross the organizational boundary such as contracts, relationships, brand 
images and networks (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Porter, 1991). Maintaining or enhancing 
this important know-how requires continuously undertaking competitive actions, which 
generates dynamic learning through trial and error as to which combinations of actions 
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work and which do not. In general, the cost of taking action is lower for the firm that has 
efficiencies derived form a rich history of prior activity. Moreover, firms with a rich 
history of competitive activity are also capable of undertaking more moves in a given time 
period. 
Action Complexity 
Firms can choose the types of actions they undertake. Some firms carry out a 
narrow range of actions, and others undertake a broad range of actions (Miller & Chen, 
1996). Action complexity is defined as the total number of types of competitive actions 
taken by a firm in a given country market each year. Consistent with previous literature, 
firms that undertake a broader set of actions than their rivals are viewed as more 
aggressive in the present study.  
Firms that carry out a broad set of action types are perceived as more capable and, 
perhaps, as less predictable (D'Aveni, 1994). Schumpeter (1934) described 
competitiveness as the ability to pursue a range of competitive actions to capture and 
sustain a lead. Miller and Chen (1996) suggested that competitive complexity can have 
profound consequences for an organization’s ability to deal effectively with the challenges 
it faces. Past success, market munificence and a lack of exposure to diverse models of 
rivalry likely cause managers to concentrate on a narrow range of competitive activities; 
these conditions shape managerial cognitions and they reduce the incentive for managers 
to search for different ways of doing things or contribute to an ignorance of competitive 
alternatives (Walsh, 1995). For instance, some managers might become so obsessed with 
cost cutting that they neglect distribution and after sales services; others might become so 
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absorbed with expansion that they forget about innovating their products and production 
processes.  
In general, action complexity is a function of search incentives that induce 
managers to look for and embrace additional ways of competing. Furthermore, it is also a 
function of managers’ knowledge about the different ways of competing and this 
knowledge can be enhanced by prior experience with various competitive methods and by 
exposure to a diversity of rivals and clients (Miller, 1993; Miller & Chen, 1996). 
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF MULTINATIONAL RIVALRY 
Firm competitive action is at the core of business strategy and competitive 
positioning. Focusing on the individual competitive action of MNEs, the overriding 
objective of this dissertation is to develop and test an integrated model of multinational 
rivalry that describes how important organizational and environmental characteristics give 
rise to both  enabling and constraining forces that influence the competitive 
aggressiveness of MNEs.  
As discussed in previous chapter, competitive dynamics research highlights the 
importance of individual firm conduct and characteristics in shaping interfirm rivalry, 
while IO economics extensively explores the effect of some contextual factors such as the 
level of industrial concentration on the competitive intensity between firms. Drawing 
insights from these literatures, a number of organizational and environmental 
characteristics, such as the extent of MNE control over subsidiary, cultural distance 
between competitors as well as between home and host markets, MNE absolute size, 
government regulations and the level of multimarket contact, were selected by the present 
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study to explain the competitive aggressiveness of MNEs along two dimensions—action 
volume and action complexity(as shown in Figure 3.1). Several factors guide this 
selection. First, theoretically and empirically, the impact of these constructs on MNE 
activities were widely supported by previous research. Second and more importantly, all 
of these constructs are likely to have direct and explicit bearing on the three essential 
driving forces of a firm’s competitive action: 1) factors that influence the awareness of the 
competitive context and challenges stemming from strategic interdependence, 2) factors 
that induce or impede the motivation to take an action, and 3) the cognitive and 
resource-based factors, which influence the firm’s capability to take action (Chen, 1996).  
For instance, government regulation was selected as one critical element of my integrated 
framework, simply because that it is likely to significantly impact an MNE’s motivation 
and capability to compete in a foreign market. Thus, basically, the present study uses this 
awareness-motivation-capability framework to link all the independent variables to the 
aggressiveness of MNE competitive action. In the following sections, I will explain in turn 
how each of the antecedents of multinational rivalry suggested in this research affects the 
competitive action of MNEs.  
 Subsidiary Control 
Expanding internationally can provide a firm with additional market access, 
economies of scale and increased ability to challenge competitors (Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2001; Kogut, 1988). In general, a firm can enter a foreign market in a number of ways: 
wholly owned subsidiary (through either internal venturing or mergers or acquisitions), 
joint ventures (minority, equal or majority ownership), strategic alliances, technology 
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licensing, manufacturing collaborations etc. Different forms of entry mode vary in terms 
of the degree of control that a firm has over its subsidiaries in the local market (Harrigan, 
1985). Viewing the MNE as a network of capital, product and knowledge exchanges 
among subsidiaries located in different countries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990), the present 
study uses subsidiary control to reflect the degree of equity ownership and the amount of 
influence that a multinational headquarters can exercise over the operating and strategic 
decisions of its subsidiaries.  
As an efficient way that an MNE headquarters can use to coordinate and modify its 
subsidiaries’ behavior, subsidiary control and its important implications for a wide range 
of MNE activities have been extensively discussed in the international business literature. 
For instance, the degree and the pattern of subsidiary control within multinational firms 
have been found to be a significant predictor of foreign investment performance (Root, 
1987; Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994), capability of knowledge transfer (Kogut, 
2000) and level of product differentiation (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Caves, 1982).  
From a competition point of view, the degree of control that an MNE headquarters 
has over its subsidiaries can influence the process through which the corporate 
competitive strategy is executed and the ability of an MNE to make coordinated efforts in 
competing with other MNEs across national markets (Franko, 1978). An efficient internal 
control mechanism safeguards the asset and information transfer within an MNE and 
enables the collective actions of subsidiaries across borders.  
Furthermore, different types of subsidiary control can give MNE subsidiaries 
different motivations to compete. For instance, consider two subsidiaries of General 
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Motors (GM), one in Mexico is wholly owned by GM; the other in Germany is a joint 
venture of GM and a local car manufacturer. When Volkswagen initiates competitive 
actions in the territories of both subsidiaries, it is not difficult to understand why the first 
one will have more motivation to fight because of the higher pressure or threat it may feel 
from this attack.  
Taken together, in a global setting, for MNEs operating in diverse national market, 
an efficient control and coordination mechanism between an MNE’s headquarters and its 
subsidiaries is critical for the effectiveness of competitive strategy at the corporate level 
(Gimeno & Woo, 1999). Without such a control and coordination mechanism, the 
competitive strategy of each subsidiary will be formulated on a market-by-market basis. 
What is optimal behavior at the subsidiary level however, might not be optimal for overall 
MNE performance. 
MNE Size  
Consistent with previous research, MNE size in the present study refers to the 
sheer organizational size such as the total assets or the total number of employees of an 
MNE. Thus, in the context of this research “small” and “large” indicate absolute rather 
than relative size. Although in certain conditions, some of my arguments may be more 
relevant to relative size, they are nonetheless also applicable to absolute size. That is, 
multinational firms that differ greatly in the absolute size of their whole corporations will 
exhibit significantly different competitive behavior in the marketplace. 
In the international business and strategic management literature, MNE size has 
long been recognized as one important contingency factor in understanding MNE entry 
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mode choice (Yu & Ito, 1988), strategic alliance strategy (Gomes-Casseres, 1994), 
internationalization process and organizational performance (Buckley & Casson, 1976; 
Lu & Beamish, 2001). Large size has been seen as giving an MNE such advantages as 
economies of scale, experience, brand name recognition and market power. Conversely, 
smallness has been credited with increasing flexibility in production and price, and with 
enhancing risk-seeking behavior (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  
MNE size can also exert significant influence on an MNE’s competitive behavior. 
For large MNEs, on the one hand, the abundant slack resources they have give them a 
greater ability to attack competitors and withstand intensified competition. On the other 
hand, behaviorally, largeness is likely to breed complacency and competitive inertia 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Miller & Chen, 1994). Managers of large MNEs  may feel that 
they are powerful enough to ignore their rivals (Cyert & March, 1963). Previous studies 
have shown that largeness is associated with structural complexity and bureaucracy, 
which often prevent a firm from responding to an attack quickly.  
In contrast to large MNEs, small MNEs are motivated to constantly seek 
opportunities in order to survive and prosper (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Katz, 1970). They 
have a greater need than their large rivals to act aggressively and to challenge the status 
quo in the host market (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). Moreover, small MNEs may also have 
some competitive devices that are typically not available to their large competitors. For 
instance, they may poke their large rivals and test their reputations by frequently initiating 
strategic skirmishes, or they can defend their “backyard” (home market) by spoiling their 
large rivals’ home markets (Casson, 1987).  
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National Culture 
National culture—a socially shared knowledge structure—provides the members 
of a cultural group with schemas or templates, for interpreting both the situation and the 
behavior of others (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). As one important way to capture the 
differences in values and norms embedded in varying national cultures, understanding 
cultural distance is key to carrying out global research. Generally, research on cultural 
distance in the international business literature can be classified into three groups. The 
first group of scholars uses cultural distance to explain the location and sequence of 
MNEs’ FDI (Davidson, 1980; Dunning, 1988; Forgsren, 1989; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Welch & Luostarinen, 1988). The second research stream focuses on the choice of entry 
mode into foreign markets where cultural distance has been found to be a very important 
predictor (Erramilli, 1991; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Larimo, 1993). Finally, in the third 
group of work, cultural distance has largely been taken to represent a hindrance to the 
performance of MNEs and their subsidiaries (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 
1997; Chang, 1995; Park & Ungson, 1997).  
Despite extensive research on cultural distance, limited effort has been made to 
examine the impact of national culture on interfirm rivalry.  Actually, culture can come 
into play in several different ways in a global competition. First, rivals from different 
countries may demonstrate different competitive behaviors. For instance, Japanese culture 
is collectivist and hierarchical, while U.S. culture is individualistic and egalitarian 
(Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Both of these cultural values have important 
implications for competitive behavior. Doyle, Saunders and Wong (1992) found that, in 
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contrast to their western rivals, Japanese subsidiaries are more oriented to long-term 
market share objectives and are more adept at tailoring their competitive strategies to local 
market conditions. Due to the important impact of cultural value on MNEs’ competitive 
activity, culture similarity between rivals is likely to help them correctly interpret each 
other’s competitive intentions and therefore increase their motivation and capability to 
interact with one another (Chen & Stucker, 1997).  
Second,  the cultural distance between an MNE’s headquarters and its subsidiaries 
will also affect the MNE’s competitive capability against its rivals. When firms are 
competing in the same country market or operating under similar circumstances, their 
ability to receive and process information about competitors and the market environment 
does not vary greatly, as information is readily available (Ghoshal & Kim, 1986). 
However when firms are competing globally, factors that are non-influential domestically 
may affect firms differently and therefore influence their competitive activities differently 
(Robock & Simmonds, 1989). Kogut and Singh (1988) argued that because differences in 
national cultures have been shown to result in different organizational and administrative 
practices and employee expectations, it can be expected that the more culturally distant 
two countries are, the more distant are their organizational characteristics on average, and 
the more difficult it will be for an MNE to coordinate its competitive actions across these 
two countries.  
Government Regulations  
The strategic management literature has long recognized the significance of 
market characteristics and their competitive implications (Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 1999). 
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Especially in multimarket competition and competitive dynamics research, the differences 
between markets in terms of strategic importance, growth potential, competitor density 
and cost advantages have been widely used to explain the asymmetrical nature of 
competitive relationships between firms.  
Despite the great promise that strategic management studies hold for 
conceptualizing multinational rivalry, the key elements of markets in an international 
context are dramatically different from those in a domestic setting (Chen & Stucker, 
1997). For instance, entry barriers in a domestic market can be measured by structural 
variables such as number of competitors, market size and R&D investment required.  
However, in a global context, these variables are insufficient to capture the diverse market 
dynamics across countries. Instead, cultural, economic, political and socio-psychological 
idiosyncrasies associated with each national institutional environment are expected to be 
more crucial in explaining the competitive actions of MNEs.  
The impact of institutional environment on a variety of MNE activities has been 
widely explored in the international business literature. Some researchers focus on the 
effect of legal and economic restrictions on an MNE’s entry mode, location choice and 
internationalization process  (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Loree & 
Guisinger, 1995; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998); while others examine the influence of 
cultural and language differences in addition to psychic distance on foreign MNEs’ 
survival (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Except for very few 
studies (MacDonagh-Dumler, 2001; Yu & Eden, 2001), most current research has ignored 
the impact of institutional environment on interfirm rivalry.  
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Despite the broad array of political, social and economic characteristics that an 
institutional environment may encompass, the present study however, concentrates on the 
role of government regulations in shaping MNE competitive activity. As noted by Chen 
and Stucker (1997), host government restrictions on FDI and interventions in MNEs’ 
daily operation directly influence an MNE’s motivation to enter certain markets. For 
example, in Japan, the daiten-ho (Small Scale Retail Law) has arguably hindered the entry 
of large-scale retailers such as Wal-Mart who benefit from significant scale economies 
(Akbar, 2000). Generally, the more receptive to foreign investment the host government 
policies are in a focal country market, the more frequently an MNE will enter and exit that 
market (Encarnation & Wells, 1986). 
Second, as more and more companies go global, they increasingly use their 
government’s regulations as a new type of competitive strategy—what Boddewyn (1986) 
called the “fourth generic” strategy. Here one research stream in the international business 
is noteworthy. In the early 1980s, a small group of scholars including Brander and Spencer 
(1981) and Krugman (1987) advanced a new theoretical approach called strategic trade 
theory.  They argued that governments could raise national income at other countries’ 
expense by sheltering national firms from international competition. Traditionally, the 
policy instrument suggested by strategic trade theory is either a tariff or a subsidy applied 
to home firms, which indirectly causes the foreign rival either to reduce output or increase 
price. With the assistance of a home government, unless the foreign government retaliates 
by offering similar protections, a “ safe backyard” (home market) will greatly motivate the 
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domestic firm to compete more aggressively in other national markets  (Yu & Eden, 
2001).  
Multimarket Contact 
The research on multimarket competition highlights the importance of shared 
markets in shaping firm competitive behavior. As the degree of multimarket contact 
between two firms increases, their aggressiveness toward each other may be tempered by 
the possibility of cross-market retaliation. This tempering of aggressiveness is known as 
the mutual forbearance hypothesis (Edwards, 1955). 
The multimarket competition literature has contributed substantial insights to 
understanding interfirm rivalry. However, as discussed earlier, this theoretical stream 
suffers from the following two limitations. First, the homogeneous domestic market focus 
prevents researchers from capturing the complexity of global competition. Almost no 
existing study in the multimarket competition arena has attempted to use this line of 
thinking to conceptualize multinational rivalry. Second and equally important, 
multimarket competition research has focused primarily on the overall aggregate effects 
of mutual forbearance. Very limited effort has been made to explore the dynamic process 
in which competitors actually enact their strategies, signal their aggressiveness, and 
defend their reputations (Baum & Korn, 1999; Chen & MacMillan, 1992).  
In filling this gap, the present study refines prior research in three ways. First, it 
applies the logic and mechanisms of mutual forbearance to a global context.  Due to the 
fast growth of internationalization in business, more and more firms are finding 
themselves competing against the same rivals in an increasing number of national and 
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regional markets. Multinational competition gives an MNE the option to respond to an 
attack by its rival not only in the challenged market, but also in other markets in which 
they both compete. Second, using the individual competitive move as the unit of analysis, 
the effect of mutual forbearance on interfirm rivalry is captured at the competitor dyad 
level. Finally, by testing the mutual forbearance hypothesis in a global context, the current 
study attempts to specify the situation under which multimarket contact may have a 
greater or weaker effect on reducing rivalry between MNEs.  
SUMMARY 
Drawing from literatures on strategic management and international business, I 
develop an integrated model in this chapter to describe how important organizational and 
environmental characteristics influence the competitive action of MNEs (see Figure 3.1).  
Theoretically, the main contribution of this dissertation lies in the fact that it takes 
into account the key differences between domestic and multinational competition. As a 
result, the importance of a number of theoretical constructs that have been largely ignored 
by the existing literature is highlighted in the present study. Empirically, this dissertation 
contributes to the literature by advancing the current research of global competition from a 
collection of anecdotes to a multidisciplinary framework with rigorous data analysis and 
testing.  
It should be noted that there are some other contextual factors that may also affect 
MNE competitive actions, such as market size, market growth rate, firm age and firm 
international experience. The effects of these factors will be controlled in hypothesis 
testing. In the following chapter, based on the integrated model of multinational rivalry, I 
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suggest nine hypotheses to predict the competitive aggressiveness of MNEs, which is 
conceptualized as two dimensions of competitive action: action volume and action 
complexity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
In this chapter, nine hypotheses are suggested to predict an MNE’s competitive 
action along two dimensions—action volume and action complexity—in a global context. 
Figure 4.1 integrates all the theoretical constructs I have discussed in Chapter III into an 
elaborated research model of multinational rivalry. In contrast to the model presented in 
Figure 3.1, this elaborated framework refines each element included in the previous model 
and considers the important interaction effect between different elements on multinational 
rivalry. In the following section, the theoretical reasoning for each of the nine hypotheses 
illustrated in Figure 4.1 is provided in turn.  
SUBSIDIARY CONTROL 
As noted by Gimeno and Woo (1999), appropriate coordination and control 
mechanisms among different organizational units are critical for the effectiveness of 
competitive strategy at the corporate level. Especially for MNE subsidiaries operating in 
diverse national markets, such coordination and control become even more critical. 
Because of its strong domestic focus, most competition research implicitly assumes that 
there is sufficient coordination across multinational subsidiaries in different countries. 
Consequently, MNE differences with respect to their capability to implement corporate 
competitive strategy have been largely ignored.  
Viewing the MNE as a network of capital, product and knowledge exchanges 
among subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990), the present study uses subsidiary control 
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to measure the extent to which an MNE subsidiary’s decisions and actions can be shaped 
by its headquarters. Compared with domestic firms, one fundamental competitive 
advantage that a multinational firm can have is to integrate its competitive position across 
national markets. Ghoshal (1987:425) argued that, to an MNE, “its competitive position in 
one national market is affected by its competitive position in other national markets”. This 
linking of competitive positions across countries implies that the international activities of 
MNE subsidiaries must be coordinated in a manner that develops and sustains advantage 
in response to the cross-national competitive forces (Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  
Considering the arguable impact of subsidiary control on the driving forces of 
interfirm rivalry, in the first hypothesis, I  predict that the strong control that an MNE’s 
headquarters has over its subsidiary in a given country market increases this MNE’s action 
volume and action complexity as it competes against other rivals in the same country 
market. In fact, conflicting views exist in the international business literature regarding the 
effect of headquarters control on a subsidiary’s international activity. Some scholars argue 
that a high level of international integration restricts subsidiary autonomy (Baliga & 
Jaeger, 1984; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986). The present study however takes a very different 
tack. It emphasizes that managing headquarters-subsidiary relationships involves 
balancing forces that call for international integrations of operation against forces that call 
for national responsiveness (Doz & Prahalad, 1984). In a global competition, it is 
important for MNE subsidiaries to consider the global market as an integrated chessboard 
and to react to competitor’s challenges in light of the whole MNE rather than just regional 
or local market gains (Chen & Stucker, 1997; Yip, 1995). Building on this fundamental 
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assumption, the positive relationship between subsidiary control and an MNE’s action 
volume and complexity can be understood from the following aspects. 
First, sufficient subsidiary control facilitates knowledge transfer and information 
flow within an MNE. Due to cultural diversity and geographic distance, information 
imperfections are likely to be much more salient in a global context (Porter, 1980). As a 
way to reduce the uncertainty, an efficient information exchange mechanism enforced by 
strong subsidiary control can help an MNE subsidiary better interpret the implications of 
its competitor’ s movements and improve its motivation and capability to undertake more 
competitive actions. Furthermore, an efficient information exchange mechanism within an 
MNE can also provide subsidiary managers with knowledge about many different forms 
of rivalry and thus gives rise to less simple competitive repertoires.  
Second, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) argued that the strong control achieved by 
administrative mechanisms provides an MNE headquarters with the ability to influence 
systems, methods and decisions of its subsidiaries and with a means to resolve disputes 
that could arise in the joint management of an enterprise. Consequently, strong subsidiary 
control contributes to the development of shared values and norms among subsidiary 
managers and therefore increases their willingness to transfer assets and share competitive 
experiences with other subsidiaries that are threatened by competitors.  
In sum, an MNE’s action volume and action complexity in a given country market 
will be enhanced when it can draw information and resources from a highly integrated 
within-MNE network enabled by sufficient subsidiary control mechanisms.  
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Hypothesis 1a: The degree of subsidiary control that an MNE headquarters has 
over its subsidiary in a given country market is positively related to its action 
volume in that country market.   
Hypothesis 1b: The degree of subsidiary control that an MNE headquarters has 
over its subsidiary in a given country market is positively related to its action 
complexity in that country market.   
MNE SIZE 
Organizational size has interested many scholars of competition. For instance, 
Chen and Hambrick (1995) empirically examined how small firms differ in competitive 
behaviors from their large rivals. Smith, Grimm and Gannon (1992) explored the 
relationship between the reputation of an attacker as a market leader and the tendency of a 
rival to imitate its action.  
Drawing from various literatures, in the second hypothesis, I suggest that the 
absolute size of an MNE is positively related to its action volume and negatively related to 
its action complexity in a given country market. In line with previous research, the 
positive impact of MNE size on its action volume can be understood from the following 
two aspects. First, large MNEs have more slack resources than their smaller rivals do. 
Organizational slack gives a firm leeway in managing responses to competitive pressures 
and allows it to execute a greater number of competitive moves (Ferrier, 2001; Young et 
al., 1996). By contrast, the relatively low level of slack resources in small MNEs inhibits 
their ability to mobilize necessary resources and constrains strategic change and 
aggressiveness (Fombrun & Ginsberg, 1990; Pettigrew, 1992). Second, to prevent their 
reputations from being damaged, large MNEs are propelled to constantly defend their 
market leadership in face of rivals’ challenges (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Weigelt & 
 
 56
Camerer, 1988). The larger the firm, the greater the reputation, and the greater the pressure 
to take actions when being threatened (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Clark & Montgomery, 
1998).  
Regarding the negative effect of MNE size on its action complexity, as noted by 
Miller and Chen (1996), size may well breed simplicity. Managers of large MNEs may 
feel that they are powerful enough to ignore their weak rivals (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
This will prevent them from broadening their cognitive models and strategies in response 
to environmental changes. The vulnerability of small MNEs, by contrast, may force 
managers to be alert to both opportunities and threats in the marketplace, and these 
challenges will also dissuade managers from becoming too narrow-minded or obsessive. 
Furthermore, large size is also associated with rules and standard operating procedures 
designed to achieve reliability and economies of scale, which may greatly constrain 
managers from experimenting with different competitive tactics. 
In sum, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a: The absolute size of an MNE is positively related to  its action 
volume in a given country market.   
Hypothesis 2b: The absolute size of an MNE is negatively related to  its action 
complexity  in a given country market.   
NATIONAL CULTURE 
Does the nationality of an MNE affect its strategy in different national markets? 
This question has consistently intrigued researchers in the international business and 
strategic management literatures. Previous research in competitive dynamics and 
multimarket competition usually assumes a homogenous cultural environment and fails to 
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capture the complexity of a global context. Responding to this gap, in the following two 
hypotheses, cultural distance is used as an important factor to predict MNEs’ competitive 
actions. Grounded in three underlying drivers of interfirm rivalry: awareness, motivation 
and capabilities (Chen, 1996), in Hypothesis 3, I explore the impact of cultural distance 
between a focal firm and its rival on the focal firm’s action volume and action complexity. 
In Hypothesis 4,  I examine how cultural distance between a focal firm’s home country 
market and host country market in which it competes influences its competitive action in 
the host country market.  
Cultural Distance between Rivals 
From a game theoretic perspective, incomplete information always hampers 
managers, who must make competitive decisions based on their estimates of rivals’ 
payoffs. Therefore, managers should welcome any vehicle that can reduce the variance of 
their estimation caused by uncertainty.  In the competitive dynamics literature, a number 
of factors playing such a role in domestic competition are suggested. For instance, Chen 
(1996) argued that each firm has a unique market profile and resource endowment and that 
a comparison with a given competitor along these two dimensions will help two firms 
illustrate the competitive relationship between them and predict how they may attack or 
respond to each other in the market. Consequently, a focal firm will compete more fiercely 
against a rival with similar resources and common market profiles. Building on the 
insights of previous research, in Hypothesis 3, I suggest that, as a key variable to carry out 
global research, cultural distance is critical in understanding the asymmetric competitive 
 
 58
relationships between multinational firms. More specifically, an MNE will compete more 
aggressively against a rival with similar cultural background across national markets.  
First, when competing across borders, culturally distant rivals are often operating 
under very different administrative practices and playing by different “rules” of 
competition, which will lead to high unpredictability of their behaviors. By contrast, two 
competitors of similar cultural background will find it relatively easy to understand each 
other’s competitive movements and strategic intentions and therefore increase their desire 
to engage with one another.    
Furthermore, firms involved in global competition begin their lives under very 
different legal, social and political environments and histories, all of which shape the 
organizational norms, structures and practices (McKendrick, 2001). Culture, as a socially 
shared knowledge structure, provides the members of a cultural group with similar 
schemas, or templates for interpreting situations and behaviors of others (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). Therefore, firms from similar cultures are likely to have similar strategic 
capabilities as well as competitive vulnerabilities in the marketplace. For instance, 
compared with their Western competitors, most Asian MNEs are strongly supported by 
their governments and have very close relationships with their domestic suppliers and 
distributors. As suggested by competitive dynamics research, when being challenged, if  a 
competitive response requires major organizational restructuring, firms will be less likely 
to respond or will respond more slowly (Chen, 1996). Conversely, firms that have similar 
competencies to the attacker will have the greatest potential and capability to retaliate.  
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Finally, firms from similar cultures are likely to be perceived similarly by foreign 
customers. And in most cases, their major customer groups are the same as well. The close 
cultural identify is likely to force two multinational firms to compete more fiercely for the 
“mindshare” of their customers.  For instance, sales in Asia account for an important 
proportion of global profits for both Toyota and Hyundai and the two firms sell similar 
vehicles to similar groups of customers. Consequently, relative to other European 
competitors, an action initiated by Toyota will give Hyundai more motivation to react.  
Therefore, I predict that the cultural distance between a focal firm and its rival 
decreases its action volume in a given market3. Regarding the effect of cultural distance on 
action complexity, I suggest that, due to the fact that firms from similar cultures are likely 
to have similar strategic capabilities, when competing against culturally similar rivals, 
managers need to hedge their bets with a diverse set of competitive methods and employ 
more comprehensive business strategies. By contrast, managers will be less driven to 
supplement their favorite competitive tactics as competing against culturally distant rivals 
because of the high uncertainty involved in estimating their rivals’ payoffs.  
Hypothesis 3a: The cultural distance between an MNE and its rival in a given 
country market is negatively related to its action volume in that country market.   
                                                 
3 It should be noted that, building on previous literature, conflicting arguments may exist 
regarding the effect of cultural similarity between rivals on competitive aggressiveness. 
For instance, according to multimarket competition theory, compared with culturally 
distant rivals, two firms of similar cultural background are likely to encounter each other 
more frequently in multiple geographic markets. Consequently, the competitive intensity 
between them will be reduced because of the possibility of cross-market retaliation. By 
contrast, the present study highlights the importance of cultural similarity in helping rivals 
interpret each other’s strategic intensions and motivating them to compete more 
aggressively due to the competitive pressure caused by similar cultural identity. 
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Hypothesis 3b: The cultural distance between an MNE and its rival in a given 
country market is negatively related to its action complexity in that country 
market.   
Cultural Distance between Home and Host Markets 
Focusing on cultural value embedded in different national markets, in Hypothesis 
4, I propose that cultural distance between the home market of a multinational firm and the 
host market in which its subsidiary operates decreases its action volume and action 
complexity in the host market.  
For a multinational firm, the cultural diversity of the markets in which it competes 
has a decisive effect on its mode of globalization and internal organization, which in turn 
affects its cross border competitive capability (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2001; Kogut & Singh, 1988). As argued by Kostova and Zaheer (1999), 
when firms set up operations abroad, they face certain unavoidable costs that they will not 
have when operating domestically. These costs of doing business in a foreign country, 
which they called “liability of foreignness”, could arise from varying sources, such as the 
high internal coordination costs, the foreign firms’ unfamiliarity with the local culture and 
other aspects of the local market or a lack of information networks or political influences 
in the host country. The liability of foreignness is likely to be more severe when an MNE 
operates in a culturally distant country. As strangers in strange land, the 
social-psychological impediments caused by cultural distance will make the multinational 
firm very difficult to survive or undertake aggressive competitive moves. 
Furthermore, general management expertise and technical know-how are more 
difficult to exploit when differences in cultural contexts make activity sharing and synergy 
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formation between an MNE headquarters and its subsidiary less efficient (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1992). Studying 1,226 intra-firm technology transfers carried out by 32 
American multinationals, Davidson and Mcfetridge (1985) found that American firms 
were more likely to transfer technology between the home and a foreign subsidiary when 
the receiving country is culturally related.  
In addition, attempts for an MNE to successfully operate multiple subsidiaries in 
diverse cultural contexts may be frustrated by conflict and frictions between the 
headquarters and subsidiaries, lack of cohesion and misunderstanding among key decision 
makers and  communication breakdowns between boundary spanners. Therefore, 
Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997) noted that expanding into culturally similar countries 
should lead to greater homogeneity of perceptions and clearer communication between the 
headquarters and foreign subsidiaries than expanding into culturally distant countries. 
Finally, the greater the extent to which MNE headquarters and subsidiaries differ 
in their cultural characteristics, the more difficult it becomes to effectively supervise the 
operation of subsidiaries. Since the local interests of subsidiaries may not always be 
aligned with those of the MNE as a whole, as cultural distance increases, the subsidiaries 
face greater liability of foreignness and more pressure to be nationally responsive. As a 
result, the challenges for the internal control system increase proportionately. Complete 
and accurate information about subsidiaries becomes difficult and expensive to obtain, 
which may significantly hinder the execution of corporate level competitive strategy. 
Taken together, I hypothesize that the cultural distance between an MNE’s 
headquarters and its foreign operations decreases its action volume in the foreign country 
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market. Moreover, I argue that a larger cultural difference between headquarters and a 
foreign operation also presents challenges and difficulties for an MNE to overcome with 
respect to information imperfection and internalization of management practice. As a 
result, most of the managerial time and resources will be spent overcoming the liability of 
foreignness and building internal information exchange mechanisms, and managers will 
feel less driven to search for alternative ways of competing or to supplement their favorite 
competitive activities (Walsh, 1995). 
Hypothesis 4a: The cultural distance between the home country market of an MNE 
and the host country market in which its subsidiary competes  is negatively related 
to its action volume in the host country market.   
Hypothesis 4b:  The cultural distance between the home country market of an 
MNE and the host country market in which its subsidiary competes  is negatively 
related to its action complexity in the host country market.   
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
When firms compete with each other across countries, market conditions are 
substantially different from those in a domestic setting. Perhaps the most critical 
determinants of market conditions are the constraints imposed by varying government 
regulations. Despite its importance to MNE competitive activity, the linkage between 
government regulations and multinational rivalry has been largely ignored in the 
international business and strategic management literature.  
National governments can impose a variety of constraints to affect the strategic 
options of multinational firms. These constraints may take the form of economic, legal, 
political or socio-psychological impediments. The present study however will only focus 
on government economic and political policy and its impact on MNE competitive 
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behavior. Assuming that there is Firm A from Country A competing with its multinational 
rivals in Country C, in Hypothesis 5, I examine the impact of government constraint in 
Country C on the competitive action of Firm A in Country C. In Hypothesis 7, I 
investigate the impact of government protection in Country A on the competitive action of 
firm A in Country C.  
The Effect of Host Government Constraint 
In Hypothesis 5, I propose that strong host government regulation against foreign 
MNEs will significantly reduce the action volume and action complexity of foreign MNEs 
in the host country market.  
First, political risk in the host environment  can have a decisive effect on an 
MNE’s competitive activity. Researchers have found that under conditions of high 
political risk, multinationals pursue low-commitment strategies such as exporting 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992) and joint ventures (Henisz & Delios, 2001). Consistent 
with previous literature, the political risk in the present study is defined as the probability 
of expropriation of assets or adverse changes in taxes, regulations or other agreements that 
force alternations in MNE operations or strategies (Henisz & Delios, 2001). High political 
risk may significantly restrict an MNE’s capability and motivation to engage in 
competitive activity in a foreign country market. For example, in 1995, when Brazil’s 
government suddenly doubled the import tax on built-up vehicles from 32 percent to 70 
percent, the tax hike generated huge losses for the country’s four principle 
carmakers—Volkswagen, Fiat, General Motors and Ford—who had planned to begin 
importing thousands of vehicles a year to round out local lineups.  
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Second, by defining how markets should operate, host governments can use 
various economic regulations to put foreign MNEs in a very disadvantageous competitive 
position. For instance, for years,  in China, foreign carmakers have had to get government 
approval not only for each new automotive venture, but for each new body style or model 
design. Majority foreign ownership of automotive ventures is completely forbidden. A 
similar scenario can also be found in South Korea. Due to high import barriers, in 1999, 
there were only 2,400 imported vehicles sold in Korea according to the Automotive Trade 
Policy Council. By imposing various constraints such as tariff and non-tariff barriers on 
foreign MNEs’ operations, host governments can force foreign firms either to reduce 
output or increase price. Moreover, using regulations such as local content requirements 
and rules of origin, host governments can also break apart foreign MNEs’ well established 
relationships with their suppliers and distributors and destabilize their efficient production 
process.  
In sum, I suggest that strong government constraint in the host country market may 
directly reduce a foreign MNE’s willingness and capability to undertake aggressive 
competitive actions. As a result, the managers’ opportunities to try out a wide variety of 
strategic options and tactics will also be greatly restrained.  
Hypothesis 5a: The level of host government constraint  is negatively related to an 
MNE’s action volume in the host country market.   
Hypothesis 5b: The level of host government constraint  is negatively related to an 
MNE’s action complexity in the host country market.   
Often host government constraints affect all foreign MNEs equally—but not 
always. Based on Hypothesis 5, one should expect a greater number of competitive 
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actions from those MNEs that are less susceptible to host government constraints. 
Consider the following example as an illustration. In 1996 because of a deal between 
South Korea and Indonesia, Indonesia’s government granted Kia the right to import 
45,000 Sephias without paying any import duties or luxury taxes. Rival automakers 
protested. Ford even left Indonesia, saying it could no longer compete.  
The Moderating Effect of Country of Origin  
In Hypothesis 4, I suggest a negative relationship between host government 
constraints and the competitive aggressiveness of foreign MNEs. In the next hypothesis, I 
further suggest that this competition-reduction effect will be much stronger when the focal 
firm competes against a rival with a similar cultural background.  
Economic and political barriers imposed by a host government will put foreign 
multinationals in a very disadvantageous position relative to their local rivals. To maintain 
their market share and increase their bargaining power over the host government, foreign 
multinationals are motivated to look for partners in the local market. In contrast to firms 
from culturally distant countries, I argue that firms with similar cultural background are 
more likely to develop cooperative relationships for the following two reasons. First, 
managers from similar cultures are likely to share similar values and beliefs and therefore 
are more capable of correctly interpreting each other’s signals and intentions. Second, 
firms from similar cultures are also likely to have common suppliers, distributors and 
customers (Porter, 1976; 1979). Repeated contact through these intermediaries increases 
the flow of information upon which interorganizational coordination is more easily 
developed (Stigler, 1968). 
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At  first glance, competition and cooperation appear to occupy opposite ends of the 
spectrum of interorganizational relationships. A small group of researchers however, has 
begun to challenge this traditional view of the competition/cooperation relationship. Some 
of them suggest that the combination of competitive and cooperative strategies can create 
higher profits, which they call syncretic rents (Afuah, 2000; Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; 
Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). Others have depicted the coexistence of competitive 
and cooperative interactions in a group-versus-group competition (Gomes-Casseres, 
1996; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991). Group-versus-group competition emerges when rival 
firms use alliances to create constellations (Das & Teng, 2001) or strategic blocks to 
compete with other constellations or blocks. Gomes-Casseres (1996) insightfully pointed 
out that such a pattern of group level competition is especially significant in a global 
setting.  
Based on the idea of group competition, I suggest that in a highly regulated host 
environment, to improve their competitive positions, foreign MNEs from similar cultures 
are likely to cooperate to a certain degree and strategically lower the competitive intensity 
against each other. Consider the competition between automakers in India as an example. 
In order to compete with the Maruti800, the market leading car model made by a joint 
venture between the Indian government and Suzuki Motor Co., Fiat and Peugeot have 
cooperated closely for years in a minivan and truck venture in India.  
 In sum, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 6a: The level of host government constraint is more negatively related 
to  an MNE’s action volume in the host country market when it competes with a 
culturally similar rival.   
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Hypothesis 6b: The level of host government constraint  is more negatively related 
to  an MNE’s action complexity in the host country market when it competes with a 
culturally similar rival.   
The Effect of Home Government Protection  
Porter (1980) developed a paradigm of three generic strategies for firms struggling 
for competitive advantage: cost competition, product differentiation and focus. Beyond 
these three generic strategies, when firms compete internationally, they tend to 
increasingly use policy measures of their home governments as a new type of competitive 
strategy. This is what Boddewyn (1986) called the “fourth generic strategy”.  
Different from Hypothesis 5, which emphasizes the competition-reduction effect 
of host government constraints on foreign multinationals’ competitive actions, in 
Hypothesis 7, I predict that multinationals will be more prone to undertake aggressive 
competitive movements in foreign countries when their home country market is well 
protected by their government. 
First, according to strategic trade theory, scholars such as Brander and Spencer 
(1981) and Krugman (1987) argue that a government’s protection can offer its home firm 
an opportunity to shape the competitive environment in such a way as to improve its 
position against foreign rivals. For years, strategic trade theory has been criticized for not 
considering foreign government retaliation. However, in the real world, we frequently 
observe that governments adopt trade policies even under the threat of other governments’ 
retaliation. Brander (1986:39) provided an explanation for this “irrational” behavior. He 
argued that “a policy action is normally the product of many different sectors”. Although a 
government regulation may not be beneficial in a rigorous economic sense (national 
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welfare enhancement), it can be used for other strategic purposes. In particular it has 
important competitive implications for domestic firms’ global expansion. In certain 
countries, new industries take a while to get established because of startup problems or 
because a particular country or region is somehow initially disadvantaged. By insulating 
home industry from competition, a government can help its domestic firms to slide down 
the learning curve and gradually gain market presence in other foreign markets (Hart & 
Prakash, 1997; Stegemann, 1989).  
American trade theorists always use Japan as a classic example of using 
government protection to support Japanese firms’ aggressive international expansion. 
From less than one percent of world production in 1955, Japan had grown to be the world 
leader in the machine tool industry by 1982.  The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) used a variety of tariffs to protect the domestic machine tool industry 
from challenge by foreign imports. As a result, government protections provided a “safe 
backyard” for the Japanese firms.  When they matured, they began to aggressively enter 
foreign markets and successfully drove many U.S. competitors out of business (Collis, 
1988: 86).   
Second, as suggested by competition research in the strategic management 
literature (Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 1999), asymmetric territorial interests can significantly 
affect the competitive intensity between two firms. Thus, it is likely that a firm can 
strategically use its collusion in a rival’s key market in exchange for this rival’s collusion 
in the firm’s important market.  This is called the “sphere of influence” effect (Edwards, 
1964).  The present study assumes that the home country market is the key market that 
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each MNE wants to protect (hub). Building on the “sphere of influence” argument, 
normally one would expect that as two multinationals compete with each other globally, in 
order to keep their homes safe, the implicit threat of reciprocal retaliation will cause them 
to mutually forbear from undertaking aggressive movements in each other’s domestic 
market. However, this conclusion is weakened by including government in the analysis. 
When a focal firm is able to use government protection to curtail its rival’s access to its 
home country market, with its “backyard” well protected from foreign penetration, the 
focal firm is likely to be more prone to make aggressive competitive moves in foreign 
countries. Moreover, without fear of retaliation at home, a safe backyard will also enable 
managers to try different tactics in an effort to attract customers or to fend off aggressive 
rivals.  
Taken together, I hypothesize that,  
Hypothesis 7a: The level of government protection in the home country market is 
positively related to  an MNE’s action volume in the host country market.   
Hypothesis 7b: The level of government protection in the home country market is 
positively related to  an MNE’s action complexity in the host country market.   
MULTIMARKET CONTACT 
Theories of multimarket competition agree that firms with high overlap in their 
business domains frequently encounter each other simultaneously in multiple product or 
geographic markets. As the degree of multimarket contact between two firms increases, 
their aggressiveness toward each other is tempered by the possibility of multimarket 
retaliation (Edwards, 1955).  
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The multimarket competition literature has provided great insights to our 
understanding of interfirm rivalry. More importantly, the logic and mechanisms of mutual 
forbearance are likely to be applicable to an international arena. Multinational competition 
gives a firm the option to respond to an attack by a rival not only in the challenged market, 
but also in other markets in which they both compete (Gimeno, 1999). As an example, 
consider the contest between Goodyear and Michelin (Hamel & Prahalad, 1985). In the 
early 1970s, Michelin used its strong European base to attack Goodyear’s home market 
(the US). Since Michelin only had a small amount of its worldwide sales in the United 
States, it had little to lose. However, Goodyear ultimately struck back in Europe, 
aggressively threatening Michelin’s prime market. By playing tough through retaliation, 
Goodyear slowed the pace of Michelin’s retaliation and forced it to recalculate the cost of 
market share gains in the United States. 
Directly applying the mutual forbearance hypothesis to global competition, I 
suggest that, as the number of multimarket contacts between a focal firm and its rival 
increases, the motivation for the focal firm to engage in aggressive competitive actions 
will be significantly reduced. Consequently, managers of the focal firm are more likely to 
concentrate their resources and attention on the competitive tactics they are familiar with 
and willing to use.  
Hypothesis 8a: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
negatively related to the MNE’s action volume against this rival.   
Hypothesis 8b: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
negatively related to the MNE’s action complexity against this rival.    
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The Moderating Effect of Country of Origin  
In the multimarket competition literature, “the market” is primarily a 
simplification of a domestic geographic market. The implicit assumption of market 
homogeneity and cultural commonality, which has been reinforced by studies focusing on 
highly homogeneous domestic industries, has greatly restricted the explanatory power of 
this research stream for conceptualizing multinational rivalry. Thus, it is important for 
scholars conducting competitor analysis on MNEs to consider factors that can capture the 
differences between domestic and global competition. As one of these factors, in the 
following hypothesis, country of origin is proposed to have a moderating effect on the 
relationship between multimarket contact and firm competitive action. 
I suggest that the competition-reduction effect of multimarket contact will be 
weaker when two multinational firms are from culturally similar countries. First, 
multinational firms with similar cultural backgrounds are likely to be perceived similarly 
by others and also likely to target similar customer groups. As a result, one would expect 
more competitive actions between culturally close rivals than between culturally distant 
rivals due to the pressures and threats they feel about each other’s attack. Second, as 
discussed earlier, firms from similar cultures are likely to have similar capabilities and 
competencies. Hence, a focal firm will be the most capable one in the market to react to an 
attack issued by a rival from a similar culture. Finally, firms from similar cultures can 
easily understand each other’s strategic intentions. Therefore, they are more likely to 
undertake aggressive competitive actions against one another. 
Thus, I hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 9a: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
less negatively related to the MNE’s action volume when the rival is from a 
culturally similar country.   
Hypothesis 9b: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
less negatively related to the MNE’s action complexity when the rival is from a 
culturally similar country.    
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, combining insights from previous literature, I investigate how 
important organizational and environmental characteristics influence the competitive 
actions of MNEs. Accordingly, nine hypotheses are offered to predict the competitive 
actions of MNEs along two dimensions—action volume and action complexity—using 
factors such as subsidiary control, MNE size, cultural distance between rivals as well as 
between home and host markets, host government constraint, home government 
protection and multimarket contact. In contrast to prior competition study, the framework 
proposed in this dissertation takes into account the key differences between domestic and 
global competition with the intention of improving our understanding of multinational 
rivalry.  
In the next chapter, I will move to the methodology section and explain how I 
identified sample firms, measured variables, collected the data, designed the study and 
conducted the statistical analysis.  
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CHAPTER V  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology used in this study. The chapter is 
organized into the following sections: 1) sample selection; 2) overall research 
procedure—data sources, data organization, identification of competitive actions; 3) 
measurement of major variables; 4) overview of the statistical analysis.  
SAMPLE SELECTION 
Regarding the empirical setting for hypothesis testing, I have considered a number 
of alternative industries such as the banking industry and the energy trading industry. The 
global automobile industry was finally selected because of the following characteristics it 
possesses. First, the industry is well known for its intense competitive interactions among 
major industrial participants (Martin, Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 1995; Thomas & 
Weigelt, 2000). Given the focus of this research on individual competitive action, it 
becomes desirable to limit the study to a highly competitive environment in which 
competitive events are more likely to be observed and firms need to be responsive to 
competitive actions taken by their rivals.  
Second, this industry has an identifiable and manageable set of major industrial 
competitors that are strategically linked. As a global industry, the international automobile 
market reflects the increasing importance of global sales and production by firms from the 
industrial triad of nations (Japan, North America and Western Europe) (Tallman, 1991). 
Consequently, a high degree of interdependence exists among these major players –which 
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is what industrial organization economists call an oligopolistic market structure. In an 
oligopolistic industry, strategic actions undertaken by one firm should have significant 
impacts on other competitors, and the outcome of an action is also highly dependent on the 
responses made by rival firms.  
Third, the industry has rich information sources regarding competitive moves 
among firms. As a large contributor to many national economies, information about the 
automobile industry can easily be found from various publications such as business 
journals, industry newsletters, and regional, national and international newspapers. More 
importantly, most of these resources are available on line. Thus, it is possible to rely solely 
on published information to identify competitive events, to trace the process of 
competitive interactions and to measure various characteristics of competitive actions and 
responses (Chen, 1988).  
Finally, the industry has a clearly defined boundary in that for most of the 
competitors, this industry represents their major line of business at the corporate level. 
That is, most firms are “single businesses” or “dominant businesses” (Rumelt, 1974) so 
the potential for confounding influences of corporate-business relationships on industrial 
competition is minimized (Chen, 1988). 
After choosing the global automobile industry as the empirical setting to study, 
data about 13 major car manufacturers based on Ward’s Automotive Yearbook were 
collected. Table 5.1 provides a list of the 13 sample firms. These companies represent all 
significant global automakers. Overall they account for 88% of world motor vehicle 
production in 2000. Hence, most of the industry’s economic activity is captured in the 
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research sample of this study. I excluded companies operating only in local or protected 
markets (generally third world countries or countries of the former communist bloc) since 
these companies neither significantly influence nor are influenced by global competition. 
Also excluded were a number of very small “craft based” sports cars manufacturers (e.g. 
Aston Martin, Ferrari, Lotus). Most of these companies produce less than 100 cars per 
year and have very specialized clientele. 
OVERALL RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
Data Source 
The approach I used to collect data is similar to that used by Smith, Grimm and 
Gannon (1992); Chen (Chen, 1988; 1996); Young, Smith and Grimm (1996) and Ferrier, 
Smith and Grimm (1999), which has been called “structured content analysis” (Jauch, 
Osborn, & Martin, 1980).  
Competitive actions of sample firms over the period Jan. 1995 to Dec. 2001 were 
identified from the Automotive News included in Business and Industry online database. 
After surveying various publications, from general business publications—Wall Street 
Journal, Business Week, Fortune—to industry specific publications—AutoWeek, 
Automotive Industries, Automotive Marketing, Automobile Production—it was concluded 
that Automotive News has the most complete  and detailed information for the purpose of 
the present study. Established in 1925, Automotive News was purchased by Crain 
Communications, Inc. in 1971. Regarded as the "Bible" of the automotive industry, 
Automotive News covers the manufacturing side of the automotive industry, including 
engineering, design, production and suppliers, with equal emphasis on the retail side of the 
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industry, including the marketing, sales, service and resale of vehicles.  Delivered weekly 
to more than 80,000 subscribers in 70 countries, Automotive News has become the leading 
source of news for the auto industry all over the world.  
To further investigate the overall accuracy, comprehensiveness and managerial 
usage of Automotive News as a source of information about competition in the global 
automobile industry, a random subsample of 20 competitive moves was drawn, of which 
17 (85%) were found and confirmed in their details by other major business publications 
and newspapers. This result is reasonable because Automotive News is more exhaustive in 
its reporting of automaker competitive actions as it is a more specialized industry 
periodical.   
Data on government regulations in different countries were largely collected from 
The Global Competitiveness Report4 published by World Economic Forum. The Global 
Competitiveness Report combines two basic kinds of data. Quantitative data are indicators 
of a country’s economic performance, technological capacity and infrastructure taken 
from a wide variety of published sources. The survey data come from the Executive 
Opinion Survey conducted each year by the World Economic Forum. The survey 
measures the perceptions of leading business executives about the competitiveness of the 
country in which they operate. The survey obtains responses from about 4,000 executives 
in the 59 countries. According to their relevance to international competitiveness, both 
quantitative and survey data are classified and distributed to eight factors such as 
                                                 
4 For certain years, when the data is not available in The Global Competitiveness Report, I 
used the World Competitiveness Yearbook published by IMD as a supplement.  
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openness, government, finance, infrastructure, technology, management, labor and 
institutions. 
In addition to data on competitive action and government regulations, data about 
MNE ownership structure and market share in different countries were collected from  
Who owns whom—the directory of corporate affiliations (Volume V for International 
Public and Private companies and Volume III for US public companies), sample firms’ 
yearly financial statements and Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. 
Data Organization 
To test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter V, three panel datasets were employed 
to examine  the competitive actions of multinational firms. It should be noted that these 
three datasets draw from the same sample firms, and they differ only in the level of 
analysis. Additionally, lower level of analysis dataset (which is Dataset 2 in the present 
study) is aggregated to create higher level of analysis datasets (Dataset 1 & 3).  In the 
following section, I introduce each of these datasets in turn and a summary can also be 
found in Appendix B.  
 Dataset 1. This dataset includes one observation per firm (the firm who initiated a 
competitive action), per country market per year.  It tests hypotheses regarding the impact 
of subsidiary control, MNE size, cultural distance between home and host markets, host 
government constraint and home government protection on multinational rivalry 
(Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7). In dataset 1, the cross-sectional unit is defined by 
firm-country market pair. All independent variables were updated each year, except 
time-invariant variables such as subsidiary control and cultural distance. The first 
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dependent variable—action volume—was measured by the total number of competitive 
moves a focal firm takes against all its rivals in a given country market and a given year. 
The second dependent variable—action complexity—was measured by the total types of 
competitive actions that a focal firm takes against all its rivals in a given country market 
and a given year.  As indicated before, the present study classified competitive action into 
nine categories: capacity action, changes in organizational structure and management 
systems, improvement of distribution and after-sales service, marketing action, pricing 
action, new product action, technology innovation, international expansion and 
diversification. 
Dataset 2. As the fundamental dataset of this research, Dataset 2 includes one 
observation per focal firm-competitor dyad, per country market per year.  It is primarily 
created to test hypotheses regarding the impact of cultural distance between rivals on 
multinational  rivalry (Hypothesis 3) and the moderating effect of country of origin on the 
relationship between host government constraint and MNEs’ competitive actions 
(Hypothesis 5). In dataset 2, the cross-sectional unit is defined by focal 
firm-competitor-country market. The dependent variable—action volume—was 
measured by the total number of competitive moves  that a focal firm takes against one 
particular rival in a given country market and a given year. Accordingly, the dependent 
variable—action complexity—was measured by the total types of competitive actions that 
a focal firm takes against one particular rival in a given country market and a given year.   
Dataset 3. This dataset includes one observation per focal firm-competitor dyad  
per year.  It tests hypotheses regarding the impact of multimarket contact on multinational 
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rivalry (Hypotheses 8 and 9). In Dataset 3, the cross-sectional unit is defined by focal 
firm-competitor dyad. Consequently, the dependent variable—action volume—was 
measured by the total number of competitive moves that a focal firm takes against one 
particular rival across all countries in a given year. The second dependent 
variable—action complexity—was measured by the total types of competitive actions that  
a focal firm takes against one particular rival across all countries in a given year.   
Identification of Competitive Actions 
Consistent with previous research in competitive dynamics (Chen, 1988; Ferrier et 
al., 1999; Smith et al., 1992; Young et al., 1996), an action is defined as “a specific and 
detectable competitive move, such as a price cut or new product introduction, initiated by 
an MNE to defend or improve its relative competitive position in a given country market”. 
I consider a competitive action significant and important if it  targeted at least one 
competitor and was reported in Automotive News.  
The present study employed a rigorous procedure to identify the competitive 
actions of sample firms in different countries. First, I developed a list of key words to 
search competitive actions reported in Automotive News. It should be noted that most of 
the key words previous researchers have used to conduct content analysis of interfirm 
rivalry were specifically chosen for the airline industry (over 80% of the research in 
competitive dynamics published in top management journals used the airline industry as 
the empirical setting). In order to select the words/phrases that suggest competitive actions 
among auto industry firms, I read all the articles published by Automotive News in 1995 
and was able to identify 211 competitive actions, from which I generated a list of key 
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words for the analysis of the full study (a full list of key words appears in Appendix C). 
Consider the following two competitive actions as an illustration. “The 2000 Altima 
(Nissan) sedan will have a new fascia to battle the Honda Accord and Toyota Camry” 
(Automotive News, June 14, 1999). “The Buick Rendezvous will have the ride and 
handling of a luxury car with the versatility of a sport-utility. It’s a response to the Lexus 
RX 300” (Automotive News, August 16,1999). Basically, these two competitive events 
were selected because of the appearance of key words—battle and response—in the text 
of two news articles. 
 Second, after generating the key word list, I identified all the news reports related 
to sample firms (72 competitive dyads) that included the key words/phrases I was 
interested in. This yielded 6,648 news articles. After an extensive and careful read of all 
these 6,648 articles, 5,188 competitive actions were identified using a pre-designed, 
structured coding schedule. The raw data were then carefully screened for duplicates. 
Only the earliest chronological appearance of a particular competitive action was retained.  
Consistent with previous research, I coded these competitive actions into nine 
action types: pricing action, new product action, marketing action, technology innovation, 
capacity action, improvement in distribution and after sales service, diversification, 
international expansion and changes in organizational structure and management systems. 
Appendix D contains the descriptions and examples of each of these action categories. To 
check the reliability of my coding, I asked one academic expert in strategic management 
to separately recode a random subsample of 30 competitive actions into each of the nine 
action categories. We were in agreement for 28 of the 30 competitive moves.  
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 Automotive News specifies the major geographic markets in which the reported 
action occurred. I replicated my coding of competitive action when more than one 
geographic market was specified. For instance, if one competitive action undertaken by 
GM against Toyota was reported to have influence in both Germany and the US, I coded it 
as two competitive moves between GM and Toyota (one in Germany, the other in US). 
Finally, I deleted countries in which less than 2 competitive moves were coded.  
Additionally, I entered 0s  when no competitive actions occurred between rivals in 
a given country market and a given year. During the time period studied in this research, 
most of the sample firms have already established their competitive presence in the world 
market. Therefore, their new entries to foreign countries are quite limited. Moreover, 
consistent with previous research, I assumed that if an action was reported as news in 
major media outlets like Automotive News, it represented a significant and newsworthy 
move from the acting firm. Consequently, I further assumed that two firms did not take 
any significant actions against each other if the action was not reported by Automotive 
News. Taking a game theoretic approach, the competitive implication of non-actions is as 
important as actions in an analysis of competitive rivalry. In the coding process, I first 
identified all the sample firms having competitive presence in a certain country market 
(one competitor is treated as having a competitive foothold in a certain country market, 
when at least one competitive move made by this competitor was coded during the period 
1995 to 2001). Then I entered 0s to all the possible combination of competitor dyads in 
that country market when no actions between them were reported.  
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MEASUREMENT 
This section discusses the measurement used for 1) two dimensions of competitive 
action: action volume and action complexity; 2) measures of organizational and 
environmental characteristics that are proposed to be antecedents of multinational rivalry 
in Chapter VI; 3) measures of important control variables. 
Action Volume 
Consistent with prior research (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999; Young et al., 
1996), action volume was measured as  the total number of competitive actions, regardless 
of type, a focal firm takes in a given year. As indicated above, this measure was 
aggregated differently for different units of analysis employed for hypothesis testing. In 
general, the greater the number of competitive actions, the greater the competitive 
aggressiveness.  
Action Complexity 
Building on Miller and Chen’s Range index (Miller & Chen, 1996), to measure the 
degree to which a firm carried out a broad range (as compared to a narrow range) of 
competitive actions, I counted the total number of types of  actions undertaken by a firm in 
a given year (scored from 1 to 9). Similar to action volume, this measure was also 
aggregated differently for different units of analysis. Firms that undertake a wider variety 
of actions than their rivals are considered more aggressive.  
Subsidiary Control  
Subsidiary control represents the degree of control that an MNE’s headquarters 
has over its subsidiary through equity.  Following Curhan, Davidson and Suri (1977) and 
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Delios and Henisz (2000), I created three dummy variables to capture the different types 
of control structures using the equity holdings of sample firms over their foreign 
subsidiaries: minority joint venture (<50%), co-owned or majority joint venture (>=50% 
but<95%), and wholly owned subsidiary (>=95%).  
MNE Size 
MNE size was measured by the annual world vehicle production of each sample 
firm for each year. This measure was transformed with a log function to reduce skewness.  
Cultural Distance  
Similar to the cultural distance measure introduced by Kogut and Singh (1988), I 
developed a composite index of cultural distance based on the four cultural dimensions of 
the Hofstede index—power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and 
individualism.  
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Where CDjk is the cultural distance of country j from country k, Iij stands for the ith 
cultural dimension for country j, Iik stands for the ith cultural dimension for country k. 
Government Regulations 
The degree of government constraint on MNE operation was assessed using the 
Executive Opinion Survey conducted each year by the World Economic Forum. To 
represent the different aspects of a government’s economic and political policy, four 
variables were used to measure MNE managers’ perceived restrictions to their business in 
a country market where they operate. The first variable—access to credit—is the average 
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response of executives surveyed by the World Economic Forum to  the statement “local 
capital markets are equally accessible to domestic and foreign companies.” The second 
variable—hidden import barriers—is the average response of executives to the statement 
“Hidden import barriers other than published tariffs and quotas are not an important 
problem.” The third variable—judiciary independence—is the average response of 
executives to the statement “The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference 
by the government and/or parties in a dispute.” The last variable—government 
bureaucracy—is the average response of executives to the statement “Senior management 
spends very little of its time dealing with government bureaucracy.” 
To establish the robustness of my findings,  I further performed a factor analysis of 
the four government regulation variables. A one factor solution was selected for 
hypothesis testing based on the traditional eigenvalue cutoff criterion of 1.0. This factor 
accounted for 55 percent of the variance in the government regulation data and had an 
eigenvalue of 2.21. The loadings for the variables were as follows: 0.80025 for hidden 
import barrier, 0.83197 for access to credit, 0.77963 for judiciary independence and 
0.51482 for government bureaucracy. 
Multimarket Contact  
In the literature, there are three ways of measuring multimarket contact. 
Market-level measures capture the overall degree of multimarket contact among the firms 
serving a focal market. These measures have largely been used in industrial organization 
economics (Evans & Kessides, 1994; Feinberg, 1985; Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Jans & 
Rosenbaum, 1996; Singal, 1996). Firm-in-market level measures represent the overall 
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degree of multimarket contact between a focal firm and its focal-market competitors. 
These measures take the average, or weighted average of the multimarket contact of the 
focal firm with each of its competitors in the focal market. Examples of this type of 
measure can be found in Barnett (1993), Baum and Korn (1996), Boeker et al., (1997) and 
Gimeno and Woo (1996). Finally, dyad measures reflect the overall degree of multimarket 
contact between two firms across all the markets where both firms are present. 
As noted by Baum and Korn (1999), multimarket contact is “not an aggregate 
property of industries, markets or firms; it is a property of the relationship between two 
firms.” Given the theoretical focus and unit of analysis of this research, the dyad 
measurement of multimarket contact was ultimately selected.  
Additionally, following the dyad measurement of multimarket contact introduced 
by Baum and Korn (1999), I incorporated information on the significance of particular 
markets to a firm by defining the measure of multimarket contact so that each market 
contact between a pair of firms was weighted by the significance of the markets to the 
firms themselves. To measure the significance of a given market in a firm’s global 
strategic profile, I divided the sales of this firm in the market by the world total sales. More 
specifically, the following measure was used to capture the level of multimarket contact 
between two firms i and j at time t: 
 
for all ΣM it (Dimt x Djmt)>1, otherwise=0 
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where m denotes a given market in the set of markets Mit or Mjt served by firms i and j 
respectively, at time t. Cimt and Cjmt are the centralities (strategic importance) of market m 
to firm i and j at time t. Dimt and Djmt are indicator variables set equal to one if firms i and 
j are active in market m at time t and zero otherwise.  
Control Variables 
A number of control variables were included to control for the impact of MNE 
international experience, MNE age and the attractiveness of a given market on 
multinational rivalry.  
First, prior research suggests that the age of a firm is likely to influence its strategic 
flexibility to take actions (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Baker & Cullen, 1993; Knickerbocker, 
1973). Older firms may have simpler competitive repertoires than younger firms and are 
more conservative in initiating aggressive actions. In this study, the age of a firm is 
measured by years since founding, as reported in Who Owns Whom—Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations. I transformed this measure with a log function.  
Second, studies examining the stability of market shares have suggested that 
high-growth industries experience less market share stability and greater turnover in 
industry leadership than low-growth industries (Caves & Porter, 1978; Mueller, 1986). 
Extending this finding to a global context, one would expect that firms in an economically 
high-growth country engage in more rivalrous actions than do firms in a low-growth 
country. To control for the impact of the attractiveness of a country market on 
multinational rivalry, five variables widely used in international business literature are 
added to my regression model: 1) purchasing-power-adjusted per capita level of GDP 
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reported in World Development Indicator database, and this measure was transformed 
with a log function; 2) annual percentage growth rate of GDP reported in World 
Development Indicator database; 3) cultural openness, which was measured by the 
average response of executives surveyed by the World Economic Forum to the statement 
“your country is open towards foreign cultures”; 4) exchange rate volatility, which was 
measured by the average response of executives surveyed by World Economics Forum to 
the statement “Over the next two years, your country’s exchange rate will be very stable.” 
5) market size, which was measured by the annual sales of vehicles in a given country 
market each year, and this measure was transformed with a log function. 
Third, the impact of international experience on a variety of MNE activities has 
been extensively explored in international business research. Erramilli (1991) showed that 
firms with more international experience tend to have more confidence in their own 
abilities to manage and evaluate market risks. Li (1995), Delios and Beamish (2001), and 
Anand and Khanna (2000) all similarly found a positive relationship between 
international experience and survival. With regard to the effect of international experience 
on competitive activity, Chen and Stucker (1997) argued that firms with extensive 
international experience have a better awareness of local and international markets and 
varying cultural and institutional norms. This knowledge and understanding enables them 
to formulate and respond to competitive actions more readily against rivals in various 
countries. Thus I controlled for the influence of a firm’s international experience, which 
was measured by the total number of subsidiaries that an MNE has all over the world 
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reported in Who owns whom—the directory of corporate affiliations. I transformed this 
measure using a log function to reduce skewness.  
OVERVIEW OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
This section briefly describes the statistical methodology used in this dissertation. 
Due to the particular data structure, a combination of time series and cross-sectional data 
at different levels of aggregation, feasible generalized least squares (FGLS)—as one 
important method  to analyze panel data—was selected to test the hypotheses generated in 
Chapter VI.  
According to Sayrs (1989), a time series is a numerical sequence, where the 
interval between observations on a set of variables (Xt and Xt+1) is constant and fixed. A 
cross-section is a unit of analysis at a single point in time for which there exists 
observations on a set of variables (Xi…Xn). When the variables for a number of different 
cross-sections are observed over a time span, the resulting data matrix is called a pooled 
time series or panel data. In this dissertation, based on the units of analysis, the 
cross-sectional unit in different Datasets was defined differently. For instance, in Dataset 
1 the cross-sectional unit is the firm-country market pair. Thus, an example of a 
cross-sectional unit would be the actions that GM undertook in the US. In Dataset 2 the 
cross-sectional unit is the focal firm-competitor-country market. An example of a 
cross-sectional unit then would be the actions that GM undertook against Toyota in the 
US. While in Dataset 3 the cross sectional unit is the competitor dyad. Accordingly, an 
example of a cross-sectional unit would be the actions that GM undertook against Toyota.  
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The methodology of analyzing panel data is a set of statistical techniques based on 
the theory of linear statistical models which focuses on estimating statistical relationships 
using panel data samples. The general form of a panel data model with N cross-sectional 
units over T periods is: 
uXY ntntntntnt +
′+= βα       [1] 
where n = 1…. N cross-sections 
 t = 1….T time points  
There are numerous ways to conduct panel data analysis, among which, the fixed 
effects model and the random effects model are arguably the most popular approaches 
widely used by economics and management scholars. The fixed effects model, which is 
also called the Least Squares Dummy Variable model, captures variation unique to the 
cross-sectional unit in an intercept that varies from cross-section to cross-section. The 
random effects model is also called the Error Components model, in which the variation in 
the magnitude and the direction of the relationship among the cross-sections is assumed to 
be random but is captured and specified in the error term explicitly (Greene, 2003).  
There is no clear rule of thumb to decide when to use fixed or random effects. 
Mundlak (1978) argues that we should always treat the individual effects as random. The 
fixed effects model is simply analyzed conditionally on the effects present in the observed 
sample. One can argue that certain institutional factors or characteristics of the data argue 
for one or the other, but unfortunately, this approach does not always provide much 
guidance. From a purely practical standpoint, the fixed effects approach is costly in terms 
of degree of freedom left, and in a wide, longitudinal data set, the random effects model 
 
 90
has some intuitive appeal. On the other hand, the fixed effects approach has one 
considerable virtue. There is no justification for treating the individual effects as 
uncorrelated with the other regressors, as is assumed in the random effects model. The 
random effects treatment, therefore may suffer from the inconsistency due to omitted 
variables (Greene, 2003).  
Considering the tradeoff between a fixed effects and a random effects model, 
similar to previous research on competitive dynamics (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999), 
I chose the FGLS estimator of the random effect model for the following reasons: First, if 
there are any regressors that do not vary within the groups, the fixed effects estimator 
cannot be computed. In this dissertation, variables such as cultural distance and subsidiary 
control do not vary over time. These variables would have to be dropped if I ran a fixed 
effects model. However, I can still estimate the random effects variance components 
(Greene, 2003).  
Second, to compare the advantages and disadvantages of different statistical 
methods, before choosing FGLS, I first ran OLS regression and the analysis produced a 
Durbin-Watson statistic which indicated the  presence of serial correlation. Furthermore, 
heteroskedasticity was also detected from the scatterplots of standardized predicted values 
with the standardized residuals. In classical regression analysis, an OLS estimator is not 
optimal in the presence of non-constant errors. However, the model can still be estimated 
using generalized least squares (GLS), if the true variance covariance matrix is known. 
Since in practice, we do not normally have knowledge of the error process, FGLS is 
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widely used because it uses an estimate of the true variance covariance matrix, avoiding 
the GLS assumption that the error process is known5 (Beck & Katz, 1995).  
FGLS allows estimation in the presence of autocorrelation within panels and 
heteroskedasticity across panels. Using two sequential transformations, FGLS first 
eliminates serial correlation of the errors, and then eliminates contemporaneous 
correlation of the errors. This is done by initially estimating equation (1) by OLS. The 
residuals from this estimation are used to estimate the unit specific serial correlation of the 
errors, which are then used to transform the model into one with serially independent 
errors. Residuals from this estimation are then used to estimate the contemporaneous 
correlation of the errors, and the data is once again transformed to allow for OLS 
estimation with now constant errors (Parks, 1967).  
SUMMARY 
This chapter described the method used to select the sample industry and firms, the 
ways that competitive actions were identified, the measures employed to gauge the 
important variables and an overview of the statistical analysis. The empirical results of the 
study are provided in the following chapter.  
                                                 
5 It should be noted that FGLS method was criticized by Beck and Katz (1995) for the 
possibility that its standard errors understate true sampling variability. Beck and Katz 
instead suggested to use OLS parameter estimates with asymptotic standard errors that are 
corrected for correlation between the panels. Using the STATA command xtpcse, I ran 
OLS/Prais-winsten models with panel-corrected standard errors on my data and obtained 
similar results as FGLS. 
 
 
 92
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section reports the descriptive 
statistics and correlations among the variables included in three Datasets employed by the 
present study. The second section presents the results of nine hypotheses developed in 
Chapter IV. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 6.1 demonstrates means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of 
the variables identified in Dataset 1. As indicated above, Dataset 1 was created to test 
hypotheses regarding the impact of subsidiary control, MNE size, cultural distance 
between home and host markets, host government constraint and home government 
protection on MNE competitive action. Dataset 1 consists of one observation per firm per 
country market per year for the entire sample window (n=1,491) (1995-2001). 
Multicollinearity between variables was checked carefully6.  
                                                 
6 I dropped two variables—international experience (which was measured by the total 
number of subsidiaries that an MNE has worldwide) and purchasing-power-adjusted per 
capita level of GDP. Although theoretically these two variables were suggested to have 
distinct effects on multinational rivalry, due to the data availability, the measures I have 
used to measure them make them highly correlated with variables such as MNE age, 
market size and GDP growth rate. Since their theoretical boundaries become highly 
overlapped with existing variables, I decided to drop them and I strongly encourage future 
researchers to try alternative measures when they are able to collect related data. 
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Table 6.2 and Table 6.3  report means, standard deviations and correlation 
coefficients of the variables identified in Dataset 2 and Dataset 3 respectively. Using focal 
firm-competitor-country market-year as the unit of analysis, Dataset 2 was constructed to 
examine the main effect of cultural distance between rivals and the moderating effect of 
country of origin on multinational rivalry. Dataset 2 consists of one observation per focal 
firm-competitor dyad per country market per year for the entire sample window 
(n=12,508) (1995-2001). By contrast, variables included in sample 3 were related to 
hypotheses concerning the role of multimarket contact played in MNE competitive action, 
in which the unit of analysis was focal firm-competitor-year. Dataset 3 consists of one 
observation per firm rival dyad per year for the entire sample window (n=1,006) 
(1995-2001). 
Stigler said “The plural of anecdote is data” (1964). Having the most detailed 
information on competitive action exchanged between sample firms, Dataset 2 is the 
fundamental dataset of the present study, from which, Dataset 1 and Dataset 3 were 
created using a different level of aggregation. To better capture the basic information 
“told” by  this dataset, I provided descriptive figures and frequency tables in addition to 
the summary statistics displayed in Table 6.2. In the following section, the important 
aspects of Dataset 2 will be discussed in turn.  
Figure 6.1 visually presented the distribution of nine types of competitive action in 
Dataset 2. Among the 5,188 competitive actions initiated by sample firms during 1995 to 
2001, there were 138 capacity actions (2.66%), 26 actions concerning changing 
organizational structure and management systems (0.5%), 106 actions concerning 
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improving distribution and after-sales service (2.04%), 138 diversifications (2.66%), 544 
actions concerning international expansion (10.49%), 460 marketing actions (8.87%), 
2,396 new product actions (46.18%), 512 pricing actions (9.87%) and 868 actions 
concerning technology innovation (16.73%). Overall, it seems that new product action, 
which includes adding new product features and introducing new models, is the 
competitive action most frequently taken by global automakers. By contrast,  pricing 
action (price cut or price increase) was found by prior studies as the most favorable  tactic 
airlines would use in the competition. For instance, of the16 types of competitive moves 
Chen (1988) was able to identify in the US airline industry between 1979 and 1986, 
pricing action accounted for over 50%. It is not a surprise that firms in different industries 
will compete differently. This supports the earlier contention that it is important to expand 
existing competitive dynamics research beyond the US domestic airline industry to other 
competitive contexts.  
The distribution of three types of subsidiary control in Dataset 2 was visually 
presented in Figure 6.2, from which we can see that majority of the sample firms chose to 
set up wholly owned subsidiaries when they entered foreign markets. Given that most of 
the countries included in this research are developed countries (a list can be found in 
Appendix E), where government restriction on foreign ownership is quite weak relative to 
many developing economies, my data seemed to suggest that global automakers tend to 
favor wholly owned subsidiary (82%) over other entry modes such as minority joint 
venture (8%) and majority joint venture (10%) when they do have such a choice in a 
foreign country market.  
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Table 6.4 summarized the distribution of competitive action in different countries. 
Among the 5,188 competitive actions initiated by sample firms between 1995 and 2001, 
93 actions occurred in China (1.79%),  563 actions occurred in France (10.85%), 512 
actions occurred in Germany (9.87%), 97 actions occurred in India (1.87%), 503 actions 
occurred in Italy (9.7%), 315 actions occurred in Japan (6.07%), 161 actions occurred in 
Poland (3.10%), 199 actions occurred in Russia (3.83%), 410 actions occurred in Spain 
(7.90%), 96 actions occurred in Thailand (1.85%), 485 actions occurred in UK (9.35%) 
and 590 actions occurred in US (11.37%). Not surprisingly, firms competed very fiercely 
in countries such as US, France, UK, Germany and Japan, where they have well 
established dealer networks, manufacturing facilities and relatively stable customer 
groups. However, it should also be noted that, as shown in Table 6.4 more and more firms 
begin to realize the importance of expanding into developing economies with great growth 
potential. As a result, we can observe a reasonable amount of competitive moves untaken 
in countries such as China, Russia, Brazil and India.  
The proportions of competitive actions initiated by sample firms in the global 
automotive market during seven-year period were visually presented in Figure 6.3. From 
which we can see that General Motors, Ford, Volkswagen and Toyota are the most active 
players in the industry. By contrast, the less competitive moves made by Daimler-Chrysler 
and Nissan relative to their compatriot rivals are quite unexpected.                                      
 In addition to Figure 6.3, Appendix F provided information on competitive 
exchanges for 78 competitor dyads (n=13x6) from Jan. 1995 to Dec. 2001. As a useful 
way to visualize the competitive relationship between sample firms, these charts revealed 
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many interesting competition phenomena which deserve attention for future research. 
First,  as illustrated in the chart, significant competitive asymmetry seems to exist between 
different pairs of rivals. For instance, consider the competitive interaction between 
Hyundai and Ford as an example. The number of competitive actions initiated by Hyundai 
against Ford was far more than the actions Ford initiated against Hyundai. Even though 
the notion of competitive asymmetry has interested a great number of scholars in strategic 
management, much more remains to be done in expanding current research to an 
international arena. Second, according to the chart, competitive actions undertaken by 
sample firms seemed to concentrate on certain months during a year. In particular, 
November and December were two months that tended to have the most competitive 
actions. Why is this the case in the auto industry? Is it possible to find time-dependent 
clustered competitive behavior in other industries? Answers to these questions surely will 
contribute to our understanding of competitive exchanges occurring in different settings. 
Finally, as shown in the chart, we can see many interesting disruptive points in the 
competitive relationships between certain firms. For instance, before 1998, there were not 
many competitive interactions between Volkswagen and Chrysler. After 1998 however, 
the competitive intensity between these two firms seemed to increase significantly. In fact, 
this is not difficult to understand if we consider the acquisition between Chrysler and 
Daimler-Benz. Since the acquisition, Chrysler has established significant competitive 
presence in Europe using Daimler-Benz’s sales networks and production facilities, which 
makes it a direct threat in Volkswagen’s backyard. Moreover, consider another example 
of a “disruptive event” which can be traced from the chart. After Chrysler purchased 34% 
 
 97
of Mitsubishi’s equity in Jan. 2000, no competitive actions were observed between this 
pair of competitors.  Did the equity alliance eliminate the competition? Is it possible for 
rivals to compete and cooperate at the same time? As a first step toward resolving these 
interesting and novel research questions,  the information included in Appendix F 
provides intuitive answers which need further investigation in the future. 
RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 This section presents the empirical results of testing Hypotheses 1 through 9, in 
which the relationships between various organizational and environmental characteristics 
and two dimensions of competitive actions—action volume and action complexity—were 
examined. To test these hypotheses, FGLS regression was run on the three datasets 
created for different units of analysis. Basically,  I conducted FGLS analyses on two 
dimensions of competitive action—action volume and action complexity separately. For 
the analysis related to each of these two action characteristics, I first ran an FGLS 
regression with only the independent variables entered as predictors. Then I added all the 
control variables to the model. Next, I entered one interaction term at a time. Lastly, I 
reported a fully specified model containing all the variables and interaction terms.  
 Table 6.5 reports tests of Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 7a and 7b, in 
which five independent variables—subsidiary control, MNE size, cultural distance 
between home and host markets, host government constraint and home government 
protection—were regressed on action volume and action complexity separately. Overall, 
 
 98
except for subsidiary control, as theory predicted, large MNE size7, cultural similarity 
between home and host country market, less restrictive host government regulation and 
strong home government protection all significantly increase the competitive 
aggressiveness of a focal firm in a given country market.  
 Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 report tests of Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 6a and 6b, in which the 
impact of  cultural distance between rivals  and the moderating effect of country of origin 
were examined. As expected, a focal firm will compete more aggressively (in terms of 
action volume and action complexity) with rivals from culturally similar countries than 
with  rivals from culturally distant countries. Regarding the effect of interaction of cultural 
distance between rivals and host government constraint, no statistically significant 
relationship was found from the analysis of Dataset 2.  
Furthermore, by retesting the hypothesized effect that subsidiary control, MNE 
size, cultural distance between home and host markets, host government constraint and 
home government protection may exert on multinational rivalry in Dataset 2 at a different 
level of analysis, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 provide additional support to those hypotheses 
confirmed in the analysis of Dataset 1. It should be noted that, in contrast to the results 
derived from Dataset 1, the hypothesized relationship between subsidiary control and 
MNE competitive action received partial support from the analysis of Dataset 2.  
 Finally, Table 6.8 reports the effect of multimarket contact on action volume and 
action complexity, as predicted by Hypotheses 8a, 8b, 9a and 9b.  Opposite to what theory 
                                                 
7 Opposite to what theory has predicted, MNE size was shown to have a positive effect on 
an MNE’s action complexity (a detailed discussion can be found in Chapter VII). 
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suggested, the mutual forbearance hypothesis, which has been widely supported 
empirically and theoretically by prior competition research was not supported in the 
global automotive industry. Instead, global automakers compete more aggressively 
against each other as the degree of market overlap between them increases. Moreover, the 
hypothesized moderating effect of country of origin was not supported either. While the 
relationship was statistically significant, the direction was opposite to that hypothesized. 
According to the empirical results from Table 6.8, culturally similar rivals actually 
compete more aggressively than culturally distant rivals when they have high multimarket 
contact with each other. 
 Overall, as shown in Tables 6.5 through 6.8, the theoretical model of multinational 
rivalry suggested in Chapter III and the associated hypotheses developed in Chapter IV 
were generally supported by the data. In the following section, I review the statistical 
evidence of each hypothesis in turn.  
Hypothesis 1a: The degree of subsidiary control that an MNE headquarters has 
over its subsidiary in a given country market is positively related to its action 
volume in that country market.   
Hypothesis 1b: The degree of subsidiary control that an MNE headquarters has 
over its subsidiary in a given country market is positively related to its action 
complexity in that country market.   
Hypothesis 1a and 1b suggest a positive relationship between subsidiary control 
and an MNE’s action volume and action complexity. To test this set of hypotheses, I used 
two dummy variables: minority joint venture and majority joint venture (the competitive 
action of wholly owned subsidiary is estimated by the intercept of the equation). As 
demonstrated in Tables 6.5 through 6.7, the first set of hypotheses was partially supported. 
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While the coefficients for majority joint venture were not significant in either Dataset 1 
and Dataset 2, the data seemed to support the existence of significant difference in 
competitive aggressiveness between an MNE having a minority joint venture and an MNE 
having a wholly owned subsidiary in the same country market (b= -0.26, p<0.1 in Model 2 
of Table 6.5; b= -0.04,  p<0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.6 and b= -0.03, p<0.01 in Model 4 
of Table 6.7). In sum, the evidence confirms the prediction that an MNE setting up a 
wholly owned subsidiary will compete more aggressively than an MNE only having a 
minority joint venture in the same country market. 
Hypothesis 2a: The size of an MNE is positively related to  its action volume in a 
given country market.   
Hypothesis 2b: The size of an MNE is negatively related to  its action complexity  
in a given country market.   
Hypothesis 2a predicts that large MNEs are likely to undertake more competitive 
actions than small MNEs in a given country market. This prediction received strong 
support in all the analyses of three datasets. For instance, as displayed in Model 2 in Table 
6.5, Model 4 in Table 6.6 and Model 3 in Table 6.8, MNE size was all positively related to 
action volume (b = 0.96, p<0.001 in Model 2 of Table 6.5; b = 0.09, p<0.001 in Model 4 of 
Table 6.6 and b = 1.44, p<0.001 in Model 3 of Table 6.8).  Regarding the effect of MNE 
size on action complexity, opposite to what theory predicted, the MNE size was 
consistently found to have a strong positive impact on action complexity across all the 
analyses ( b = 0.34, p<0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.5; b = 0.09, p<0.001 in Model 4 of 
Table 6.7 and b = 0.52, p<0.001 in Model 6 of Table 6.8). Therefore, relative to small 
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MNEs, large MNEs will undertake a broader set of competitive devices in a given country 
market and Hypothesis 2b was not supported. 
Hypothesis 3a: The cultural distance between an MNE and its rival in a given 
country market is negatively related to its action volume in that country market.   
Hypothesis 3b: The cultural distance between an MNE and its rival in a given 
country market is negatively related to its action complexity in that country 
market.   
As predicted in Hypotheses 3a and 3b, the negative effect of cultural distance 
between rivals on an MNE’s action volume and action complexity was strongly 
supported. Overall, cultural distance between rivals seemed to be a good predictor for the 
asymmetric competitive relationships between multinational firms. It displayed a 
consistent negative impact on MNE competitive action in all 14 models reported in Tables 
6.6 through 6.8. For instance, as shown in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 the coefficients for 
cultural distance between rivals were negative and significant for both action volume (b = 
-0.03, p<0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.6) and action complexity (b = -0.03, p<0.001 in 
Model 4 of Table 6.7). Accordingly, one would expect that Toyota will compete more 
fiercely with Honda than competing with Renault in US due to the smaller cultural 
distance between Toyota and Honda.   
Hypothesis 4a: The cultural distance between the home country market of an MNE 
and the host country market in which its subsidiary competes  is negatively related 
to its action volume in the host country market.   
Hypothesis 4b:  The cultural distance between the home country market of an 
MNE and the host country market in which its subsidiary competes  is negatively 
related to its action complexity in the host country market.   
With respect to cultural distance between home and host country market, its 
negative impact on an MNE’s competitive action, as suggested in Hypotheses 4a and 4b 
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received strong support from the analyses of both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2. Evidence 
suggests that cultural distance between an MNE’s headquarters and its foreign subsidiary 
contributes substantially to explaining this MNE’s competitive behavior in the foreign 
country market. As indicated in Tables 6.5 through 6.7, coefficients for cultural distance 
between home and host markets were significant for action volume (b = -0.32 in Model 2 
of Table 6.5; b = -0.03 in Model 4 of Table 6.6); and action complexity (b = -0.08 in 
Model 4 of Table 6.5; b =      -0.03 in Model 4 of Table 6.7) all at the 0.001 level.   
Hypothesis 5a: The level of host government constraint is negatively related to  an 
MNE’s action volume in the host country market.   
Hypothesis 5b: The level of host government constraint is negatively related to  an 
MNE’s action complexity in the host country market.   
 Hypotheses 5a and 5b predict that strong host government restriction diminishes 
an MNE’s motivation to compete aggressively. This set of hypotheses received substantial 
support from the analyses of both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2. As reported in Table 6.5 and 
Table 6.6, host government restriction was negatively related to both action volume (b = 
-0.80, p<0.001 in Model 2 of Table 6.5; b = -0.01, p<0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.6) and 
action complexity(b = -0.19, p<0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.5; b=     -0.01, p<0.001 in 
Model 4 of Table 6.7).  
Hypothesis 6a: The level of host government constraint is more negatively related 
to  an MNE’s action volume in the host country market when it competes with a 
culturally similar rival.   
Hypothesis 6b: The level of host government constraint is more negatively related 
to  an MNE’s action complexity in the host country market when it competes with a 
culturally similar rival.   
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 Hypotheses 6a and 6b suggest that the competition-reduction effect of host 
government restrictions on an MNE’s competitive action will be stronger when the MNE 
is competing against a rival from culturally similar country. To test this set of hypotheses, 
I created a multiplicative term to capture the interaction of cultural similarity between 
rivals with host government constraint. Possibly due to the small variance in sample firms’ 
country of origin (in this research, the 13 sample firms come from only 6 countries in 
total—US, Japan, Korea, Italy, Germany and France), none of the coefficients for the 
interaction term was statistically significant for action volume and action complexity, 
even though all were positively signed, as expected. Therefore, Hypotheses 6a and 6b 
were not supported.  
Hypothesis 7a: The level of government protection at home is positively related to  
an MNE’s action volume in the host country market.   
Hypothesis 7b: The level of government protection at home is positively related to  
an MNE’s action complexity in the host country market.   
Hypotheses 7a and 7b predict a positive relationship between the level of an 
MNE’s home government restriction and its action volume and action complexity in the 
host country market. Having their home country market well protected by the government 
regulation, according to this set of hypotheses, MNEs will be more willing and more 
motivated to compete aggressively in foreign countries. Overall, Hypotheses 7a and  7b 
were strongly supported, as home government restriction was found to be positively 
related to both action volume (b = 0.85, p<0.001 in Model 2 of Table 6.5; b = 0.02, 
p<0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.6)and action complexity (b = 0.22, p<0.001 in Model 4 of 
Table 6.5; b = 0.02, p<0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.7).  
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Hypothesis 8a: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
negatively related to the MNE’s action volume against this rival.   
Hypothesis 8b: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
negatively related to the MNE’s action complexity against this rival.    
As discussed in Chapter V, two sets of hypotheses (Hypothesis 8 and 9) predicting 
the impact of multimarket contact on MNE competitive action were tested in Dataset 3, in 
which the unit of analysis is focal firm-competitor-year. Extending multipoint competition 
research to an international context, Hypotheses 8a and 8b suggest that two firms will 
mutually forbear from competing aggressively against each other as the level of 
multimarket contact between them increases.  Overall, empirical results did not support 
this prediction. The coefficients for multimarket contact were statistically significant, but 
consistently positively signed in all models reported in Table 6.8, which indicates that 
multinational firms will compete aggressively against each other as the degree of market 
overlap between them is high.  
Hypothesis 9a: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
less negatively related to the MNE’s action volume when the rival is from a 
culturally similar country.   
Hypothesis 9b: The level of multimarket contact between an MNE and its rival is 
less negatively related to the MNE’s action complexity when the rival is from a 
culturally similar country.    
 Hypotheses 9a and 9b predict that cultural distance between rivals will interact 
with multimarket contact to influence the competitive action of an MNE. More 
specifically, this set of hypotheses argues that the competition-reduction effect of 
multimarket contact will be weaker when an MNE is competing against a culturally 
similar rival. As presented in Table 6.8, the coefficient for the interaction term was 
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statistically significant but in a direction opposite to that hypothesized. Therefore, the 
results suggest that the influence that  multimarket contact exerts on action volume and 
action complexity will become even stronger when the MNE is competing against a rival 
with a similar cultural background. Thus, Hypotheses 9a and 9b were not supported.  
 Regarding the impact of control variables included in the present study, GDP 
annual growth rate, market size and exchange rate volatility displayed a consistent and 
significant influence on MNE’s competitive action in all models reported in Tables 6.5 
through 6.7. All else equal, an MNE will compete more aggressively in a country market 
with a fast growing economy, reasonably large automotive market and low exchange rate 
volatility. By contrast, neither MNE age nor cultural openness showed any significant 
association with an MNE’s action volume and action complexity. 
SUMMARY  
 This chapter presents the empirical evidence regarding the antecedents of 
multinational rivalry. A summary of all the empirical results can be found in Table 6.9.  As 
predicted by the theoretical model developed in Chapter III, evidence supports that 
subsidiary control plays an important role in explaining the competitive aggressiveness of 
MNEs. The size of an MNE is also a good predictor for its competitive behavior across 
countries. Consistent with previous research, cultural similarity between rivals as well as 
between home and host markets increase the action volume and action complexity of an 
MNE. With respect to the effect of government regulation, strong host government 
restriction diminishes an MNE’s tendency to compete aggressively in the host country 
market. Strong home government restriction however, promotes aggressive competitive 
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actions among domestic firms in foreign countries. Interestingly, no hypothesis related to 
multimarket contact was supported in the present study, which suggest a promising 
direction for future research.  A further discussion of these empirical results will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
This final chapter includes the following sections: 1) discussion, 2) implications, 
3) limitations, 4) future research directions. The discussion section summarizes what has 
been found and what can be learned from the empirical results presented in the preceding 
chapter. The second section discusses the implications of this study from both a strategy 
researcher and a managerial practitioner’s viewpoint. The emphasis for strategy 
researchers concentrates on both research content and methodology; for managerial 
practitioners, the focus changes to strategic suggestions which may help them compete 
more effectively in a global context. The section on limitations highlights some 
unresolved problems of this study. Future research directions are proposed in the last 
section. 
DISCUSSION 
Focusing on the individual competitive action, the primary purpose of this 
research is to explain the competitive actions of multinational firms in a global context. 
Taking a multidisciplinary and integrative approach, various organizational and 
environmental characteristics were proposed as important antecedents of multinational 
rivalry. In the following section, each of these characteristics is evaluated in terms of its 
impact on the two dimensions of an MNE’s competitive action—action volume and action 
complexity. 
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Subsidiary Control 
 Subsidiary control in the present study was defined as the extent to which an MNE 
subsidiary’s decisions and actions are shaped by its headquarters. According to the 
theoretical model of multinational rivalry developed in Chapter III, strong subsidiary 
control facilitates information flow and resource transfer within an MNE and therefore 
increases the motivation and capability of an MNE’s subsidiary to compete in a local 
market. The empirical evidence reported in Chapter VI partially supports the argument 
that there is a positive impact of subsidiary control on an MNE’s action volume and action 
complexity. Within the same country market, the competitive aggressiveness of an MNE 
having a minority owned joint venture (<50%)was found to be significantly different from 
that of an MNE having a wholly owned subsidiary (>95%). However, the differences in 
competitive action between an MNE having a majority owned joint venture (>50% and 
<95%) and an MNE having a wholly owned subsidiary were not significant. This result 
might be explained by the following reason. Constrained by data availability, there is not 
enough variance in subsidiary control structure among sample firms. In contrast to 
previous research (Delios & Henisz, 2000), most countries from which I was able to 
collect data on sample firms’ ownership structure were developed countries. As showed in 
Figure 6.2, of all the subsidiaries that sample firms had in 28 countries, about 82% of them 
were wholly owned.  
The use of single measures for all the variables is one of the possible limitations of 
this study. In fact, in addition to the equity arrangement—a measure widely used to 
capture the degree of control that an MNE headquarters has over its subsidiaries—several 
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plausible alternative measures can also be found in the literature. For instance, Kobrin 
(1991) developed an index to measure the degree of an MNE’s transnational integration, 
using the ratio of intrafirm trade to an MNE’s total international sales. Furthermore, in his 
research examining the impact of international corporate strategy on multinational firms’ 
entry modes, Hazring (2002) identified four categories of MNE control 
mechanisms—personal centralized control, bureaucratic formalized control, output 
control and control by socialization and networks. Thus, the use of control measures 
beyond equity holding could contribute importantly to future research on multinational 
rivalry.  
MNE Size 
 MNE size was hypothesized to have a positive effect on an MNE’s action volume. 
The results reported in Chapter VI provide strong support for this prediction. Relative to 
their smaller rivals, abundant slack resources give a large MNE more ability to attack 
competitors and withstand intensified competition. Regarding the impact of MNE size on 
its action complexity, opposite to what theory predicted, the empirical evidence suggests a 
positive relationship between an MNE size and its action complexity. In fact, this finding 
can be interpreted in the following two ways. First, the present study used the annual 
world product to measure the absolute size of sample firms. Results might be different if 
relative size measures or alternative absolute size measures were used. Second, compared 
with their smaller rivals, large MNEs have accumulated more competitive experiences 
through exposure to a variety of competitors and customers in different national markets. 
They know how to compete using a broad arsenal of weapons. Having tried out many 
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different competitive methods, large MNEs are more capable of developing the skills to 
compete in a more multifaceted way. Their managers could also have formed some 
political or economic commitments towards a larger set of competitive tools. In contrast, 
small MNEs may have less international experiences than their large rivals. They may be 
less aware of the potential of alternative competitive methods and therefore lack the 
knowledge to implement them.  As a result, they will choose to concentrate on fewer 
modes of competition.  
 Due to limited data availability, in the present study MNE size was measured by 
the annual total production of the MNE worldwide. However, many other relative size 
measures, such as the proportion of an subsidiary’s number of employees to the total 
number of employees of an MNE, or the proportion of an subsidiary’s sales to the total 
foreign sales of an MNE, are observed in the literature. Although the data to construct 
these measures are not available at this time for my sample, it would be worthwhile to 
consider these alternative measures for scholars conducting global competition research in 
the future. 
 Finally, as suggested by Chen and Hambrick (1995), small firms and large firms 
may employ different tactics to compete. In particular small firms have a greater need than 
their larger rivals to act aggressively and to challenge the status quo in the market place. 
Instead of initiating large-scale competitive actions, small firms are more likely to 
undertake frequent strategic skirmishes to challenge their larger rivals’ reputations. 
Taking a game theoretic approach, Casson (1987: 51) argued that, “A technologically 
advantaged firm in a global industry confronts a technologically weak firm. Although 
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disadvantaged, the weak firm is not entirely without power, because it can spoil the strong 
firm’s home market. The weak firm defends itself, therefore, not in its own home market 
where it is under attack, but through counter-attack in the strong firm’s home market. It 
does this because it believes that the strong firm has more to lose in its own home market 
than it has to gain by aggression overseas.”  Constrained by the scope of this research, 
only two dimensions of an MNE’s competitive action were examined. Much more 
remains to be done to refine the present study by investigating the different competitive 
devices used by firms of varying sizes.  
National Culture 
Understanding cultural distance is key to conducting global research. Despite 
extensive studies on cultural distance, limited effort has been made to examine the impact 
of national culture on multinational rivalry. To fill this gap in the literature, the theoretical 
model developed in Chapter III investigated the role of national culture played in global 
competition  by suggesting the following two hypotheses: First, cultural distance between 
a focal firm and its rival decreases action volume and action complexity as the firm 
engages the rival in a given country market. Second, when an MNE operates in a 
culturally distant country market, the cultural distance between home and host country 
market diminishes its motivation and capability to compete. Overall, results reported in 
Chapter VI strongly support these two hypothesized relationships between cultural 
distance and MNE competitive action.  
 The present study used the Hofstede index to measure cultural distance between 
rivals as well as between home and host markets. The Hofstede index includes five 
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dimensions: individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, 
masculinity-femininity and long-term vs. short-term orientation. Consistent with previous 
research, I created an aggregated measure of cultural distance based on the four 
dimensions of the Hofstede index (individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance 
and masculinity). In fact, to verify the choice of measure, I ran separate set of FGLS using 
each of the four dimensions of the Hofstede index.  The results were reasonably consistent 
with what was reported using only the aggregated measure. Despite its popularity, the 
Hofstede index has been widely criticized (Shenkar, 2001). As a result, a number of 
alternative measures such as Ronen and Shenkar (1985)’s culture-cluster index and 
Schwartz (1994) cultural value index were considered. Finally, I decide to rely on the 
value scheme developed by Hofstede (1980; 1990), due to its particular relevance to my 
research question and the fact that it had the least number of missing values for the  
countries included in my sample. 
Host Government Constraint 
Host government constraint was proposed to be negatively related to an MNE’s 
action volume and action complexity. The empirical results reported in Chapter VI 
provide substantial support to this set of hypotheses. As indicated before, when firms 
compete with each other across borders, market conditions are significantly different from 
those in a domestic setting. Perhaps the most critical determinants of market conditions 
are the constraints imposed by varying government regulations. Despite its importance to 
competitive activity, the linkage between government regulations and multinational 
rivalry has been largely ignored in the literature. Thus, both the theory development and 
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the empirical findings of this study regarding the importance of government policy in 
shaping MNE competitive behavior contribute valuable insights to both MNE and 
competition literature. 
 Although the negative main effect of host government constraint on action volume 
and action complexity was consistently confirmed in 12 models reported in Chapter VI, 
the interaction of host government constraint with cultural similarity between rivals did 
not have a significant impact on multinational rivalry. The lack of support for this 
interaction effect suggests that competing with a culturally similar rival does not 
necessarily strengthen the negative effect of host government constraint on a focal firm’s 
competitive aggressiveness. This result can be interpreted in two ways. First, as shown in 
Appendix E, the 13 sample firms selected by this research come from 6 different countries 
in total. The limited variance of cultural distance between rivals likely hampers the impact 
this interaction term might exert on an MNE’s action volume and action complexity for 
this sample setting. Second, the  insignificant interaction effect between host government 
constraint and cultural similarity between rivals provides additional support to 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b, in which culturally similar rivals are proposed to compete more 
aggressively with each other due to the ease of understanding of competitive signals and 
similar strategic competencies within the competitive pair.  
 In supplemental analyses (not proposed in the theoretical model developed in 
Chapter III), I tested for the possible impacts other contingency variables might exert on 
multinational rivalry. I added a dummy variable, local rival (which is coded as 1 if the 
focal firm is competing with a local competitor and 0 otherwise), to capture the 
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competitive asymmetry existing between different pairs of competitors. According to the 
exchange of threat model developed by strategic interaction theory (Casson, 1987; 
Graham, 1990; Veugelers, 1995) and the sphere of influence effect suggested by the 
multimarket competition literature (Gimeno, 1999; Simmel, 1950), a focal firm can 
strategically use its subordination in a rival’s important market in exchange for this rival’s 
subordination in its important market. Viewing the home market as the most important 
market for an MNE to defend, a foreign MNE is expected to compete less aggressively 
with a local firm than with a non-local firm, in exchange for the local firm’s less 
competitive behavior in the MNE’s home country market. As displayed in Table 6.6 and 
Table 6.7, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for local rival in all 6 models 
indicates that, opposite to what competition research has suggested, a foreign MNE will 
compete more aggressively with a local competitor than with a non-local competitor. In 
the literature, the empirical evidence regarding the exchange of threat model has not been 
completely consistent and most of the studies conducted have been case-based or 
descriptive by nature. By contrast, the idea of sphere of influence has received general 
support from a significant number of studies using domestic industries as the empirical 
setting. Therefore, the contradictory, and to a certain extent surprising results suggest by 
the present study point out interesting directions for future research.  
 As shown in Model 4 of Table 6.6 and Table 6.7, in addition to examining the 
effect of local rival, the interaction of local rival with host government constraint was also 
added to the regression equations. Competition theory predicts that, because of the sphere 
of influence, the negative impact of host government restriction on a foreign MNE’s 
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competitive action will be stronger when it competes with a local rival. This prediction 
was not supported, as indicated by the positive (as expected) but insignificant coefficient 
of this interaction term for both action volume and action complexity. Thus, the negative 
effect of host government restriction on an MNE’s competitive action is not necessarily 
stronger when the MNE is competing with a local rival, at least for my sample.  
Home Government Protection 
The government protection at home was hypothesized to have a significant impact 
on an MNE’s competitive action in a host country market. As supported by the results 
displayed in Chapter VI,  the strong positive effect of home government restriction on an 
MNE’s action volume and action complexity suggests that, when the domestic market of a 
foreign MNE is well protected by its home government, it will be more willing and 
capable of competing in the host country market. This finding is consistent with the 
argument of strategic trade theory in the international business literature (Brander, 1986; 
Brander & Spencer, 1985; Krugman, 1987). According to this research stream, a 
government strategically using its policy measures can offer its home firm an opportunity 
to shape the competitive environment in such a way as to improve its competitive position 
relative to foreign rivals.  
 In fact, national governments can impose a variety of restrictions and regulations, 
and these are very likely to vary across countries. Due to limited data availability, the 
present study concentrates on the effect of a government’s defensive policy measures 
which may either protect its domestic market from foreign entry or constrain foreign 
MNEs’ daily operation. In fact, different types of government regulations are likely to 
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influence domestic firms’ competitive behavior differently. For instance, in addition to 
imposing diverse restrictions on MNEs’ operations and thereby lowering competition at 
home, a government can directly help its home firms to open foreign markets by providing 
financial support, or by negotiating with the foreign government to secure better market 
access for home firms.   
Consider U.S.-Japan trade frictions as an example.  In a succession of bilateral 
negotiations since 1985, the U.S. government has demanded that the Japanese government 
reduce or eliminate barriers to a few industries where US companies are competitive on a 
global level but underrepresented in Japan (e.g. autos, computers). To Americans, the 
overarching goal of these negotiations is to improve U.S. access to the Japanese market, 
but not to reduce Japan's access to the American market. As an important player in global 
competition, a government’s different types of regulation will influence an MNE’s 
motivation and capability to compete differently. Therefore, it is important for future 
researchers to extend the current study by investigating the influence of other types of 
government policies on multinational rivalry. 
Multimarket Contact 
 Consistent with research in the strategic management and industrial organization 
economics literatures (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Evans & Kessides, 
1994; Feinberg, 1984; Feinberg, 1985; Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Mester, 1987; Scott, 
1982); (Barnett, 1993; Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 1994; Gimeno & Woo, 
1996; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Porter, 1980; Smith & Wilson, 1995; Witteloostuijn & 
Wegberg, 1992), the multimarket contact between a focal firm and its rival was expected 
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to have a negative impact on the focal firm’s competitive aggressiveness. Contrary to what 
theory predicted, the results reported in Chapter VI demonstrate a strong positive 
relationship between multimarket contact and an MNE’s action volume and action 
complexity. More specifically, the empirical results suggest that as the degree of market 
overlap between a focal firm and its rival increases, the focal firm will fight more 
aggressively against this rival across national markets.  
 Two reasons seem likely to explain this result. First, as discussed in Chapter V, the 
present study used dyad measurement of multimarket contact. The empirical findings 
might be different if alternative measures were employed. Second, and more importantly, 
as the core of multimarket competition theory, the mutual forbearance hypothesis, which 
has been supported by a significant number of studies, seems difficult to sustain in a global 
context.  
As a research argument that has long interested scholars from different disciplines, 
mutual forbearance, a form of tacit collusion in which firms avoid competitive actions 
against those rivals they meet in multiple markets, is proposed to occur as multimarket 
contact increases familiarity between firms and their ability to deter each other. As one of 
the basic premises underlying multipoint competition theory, the condition—ability to 
deter each other—has to be satisfied in order for the mutual forbearance hypothesis to 
work. Jayachandran, Gimeno and Varadarajan (1999) defined deterrence as the extent to 
which a firm is able to prevent its rivals from initiating competitive actions that may be 
harmful to its interests in the market. Mutual forbearance between two firms is likely to 
occur only when they hold credible threats of retaliation against each other. In such 
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situations, firms might not compete aggressively simply because the expected gains from 
aggressive moves may be lower than the future losses due to competitive retaliation. In 
effect, it is the “the shadow of the future” that creates a link between the future payoffs for 
a firm and its present actions. In a global context, the diverse cultural background 
compounded by extremely complex market conditions make unilateral cheating behavior 
much easier and more difficult to identify. As a result, the collusion or mutual forbearance 
between firms are quite difficult to sustain due to the weakened effect of “the shadow of 
the future”.  
 Moreover, as indicated in Chapter III, multimarket competition will lead to mutual 
forbearance and lower intensity of competition between two firms only if each firm 
achieves effective coordination between the administrative units that manage the 
operations in all markets both firms compete in. In a multinational setting, geographic 
distance, differences in language and historical heritage and varying regulations and 
economic conditions make coordination within an MNE very difficult. For instance, for an 
MNE pursuing a multidomestic strategy, its subsidiaries are autonomous and are allowed 
to be very responsive to local markets. Hence, the intrafirm coordination essential to 
executing a corporate-level competitive strategy is not easy to achieve.  
 Finally, in their seminal work, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) insightfully noted 
that “when identical firms with identical constant-returns-to-scale technologies meet in 
identical markets, multimarket contact does not aid in sustaining collusive outcomes”. 
Hence, the key to mutual forbearance is the asymmetry between markets, rivals and the 
competitive positions of rivals in the market. Whenever asymmetry is present, the effect 
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of multimarket contact resembles a transfer of enforcement power from one market to 
another. In an international arena, the competitive linkages across countries are quite 
limited, especially in a less globalized industry. In this context, a firm’s competitive 
position in one country market is largely unrelated to its competitive position in another 
country market. As a result, the ability for a firm to transfer its market power from one 
country market to another may be quite restricted.  
 Taken together, given the challenge of satisfying the required conditions of mutual 
forbearance, the competition-reduction effect of multimarket contact is relatively difficult 
to achieve in a global competition. In fact, this logic might also explain the contradictory 
and equally unexpected negative interaction effect between multimarket contact and 
cultural similarity between rivals. As indicated by the results reported in Chapter VI, 
opposite to what theory predicted, competing against culturally similar rivals does not 
necessarily weaken the impact of multimarket contact on an MNE’s competitive action.  
IMPLICATIONS 
 This study has implications for both strategy researchers and managerial 
practitioners. This section is thus organized into 1) research implications, and 2) practical 
implications. 
Research Implications 
 Contributions of this study are made to strategic management literature in the 
following two aspects: 1) research content, and 2) research methodology. 
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Research Content 
 The present study has several implications for research content. First, focusing on 
the individual competitive action, the overriding objective of this dissertation is to develop 
a framework to improve our understanding of multinational rivalry. As discussed in 
previous chapters, most prior competition studies implicitly assume cultural commonality 
and market homogeneity. Thus, it is important for scholars to extend current competition 
research to a much broader context and investigate the differences between domestic and 
global competition. Recognizing this gap in the literature, the present study examined the 
impact of a number of organizational and environmental characteristics, which have been 
largely ignored by existing literature, on multinational firms’ competitive action. For 
instance, according to the theoretical model developed in Chapter III, when firms compete 
against each other across borders, factors such as strong corporate control over local 
subsidiaries, cultural distance between competitors, market diversity, and government 
regulation are all likely to influence the drivers of interfirm rivalry and therefore affect an 
MNE’s competitive behavior. As one of very few studies on multinational rivalry in the 
strategic management field, the theoretical framework created in this dissertation and 
associated empirical findings provide an important first step to analyze the competitive 
actions of multinational firms across diverse country markets.  
 Second, according to Chen and Stucker (Chen & Stucker, 1997), the significance 
of various drivers of interfirm rivalry may vary across different cultural settings. 
Investigation into such variables as competitive action volume and action complexity, 
which have been highlighted in the competition literature, may yield different results 
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depending on the cultural and national context being studied. Thus, by applying the 
theoretical arguments of previous competition research to an international context, the 
present study not only helps scholars gain further understanding about the validity of these 
research streams, but also provides empirical evidence on the contingencies that might 
make prior theoretical predictions more or less likely to occur in a global competition. For 
instance, as shown from the results reported in Chapter VI, all else equal, strong home 
government protection significantly promotes domestic firms’ competitive actions 
abroad, which provides direct support to strategic trade theory. Moreover, opposite to 
what the mutual forbearance hypothesis suggests, the multimarket contact between a focal 
firm and its rival was found to have a positive impact on the focal firm’s competitive 
aggressiveness. Sitting as the core of multimarket competition theory, the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis has been confirmed by a large number of studies using only 
domestic industry as their empirical settings.  The unexpected results in this dissertation, 
therefore, point to interesting and important topics for future research. 
 Finally, following Porter’s (1980) conceptualization of strategy as a series of 
competitive moves taken by a firm as it strives for competitive advantages against others, 
the basic unit of analysis in this study is individual competitive moves. This micro 
approach is likely to reveal insightful information about how competitive advantage is 
created and sustained and how the structure of an industry evolves as a result of shifts in 
competitive methods that firms use. Moreover, this research captures the dynamics of 
multinational rivalry by studying the individual competitive action, a level at which 
“actual competitive engagement occurs,  in which competitors enact their strategies, test 
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their opponents’ mettle and capabilities, defend their reputations, and signal their 
toughness, via their actions and reactions” (Chen & MacMillan, 1992: 541). 
Research Methodology 
Consistent with previous research (Chen, 1988; Ferrier et al., 1999; Smith et al., 
1992; Young et al., 1996), this dissertation employs a direct approach using structured 
content analysis of archival data to identify competitive actions of multinational firms in 
different national markets. This approach significantly contrasts with many competition 
studies in which competition is inferred indirectly from either cross-sectional survey data 
or year end financial data. Thus, the results yielded in this dissertation should be more 
applicable to practicing managers and more replicable in other settings.  
Moreover, as a “technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically 
identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Hosti, 1969: 14), content analysis has 
been widely used by social scientists to examine a variety of research topics. Riffe, Lacy 
and Fico (1998) argued that content analysis is especially useful  under the following 
conditions: 1) when it is difficult to access data; 2) when a researcher is limited to archival 
evidence; 3) when the volume of data surpasses the investigator’s ability to conduct 
research. Although content analysis—as a powerful and effective research approach—has 
already attracted attention from a small group of scholars in strategic management, overall 
the exploration of the application of this research method has remained limited. Therefore, 
the approach this dissertation employed to collect data might be useful for scholars 
interested in doing content analysis on other research topics. 
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Practical Implications 
The present study reinforces the notion of competitor analysis whereby a manager 
must know, understand and predict the competitive moves and responses of rivals (Porter, 
1980). Nowadays, more and more firms do business internationally. Given the increasing 
price that these firms have to pay to play in global competition, the theoretical framework 
and empirical findings of this dissertation might be valuable for multinational managers in 
the following two aspects. First, managers can use the basic approach of the present study 
to develop a sound understanding of their own resources and capabilities, in contrast to 
their rivals, for engaging in global competition across national markets. Second, the 
present study might help managers develop predictions about their competitors’ likely 
movements in diverse national markets and therefore increase their readiness to initiate 
aggressive actions or respond to threats swiftly. 
LIMITATIONS 
 There are five main limitations of this dissertation. First, because the findings of 
the present study are based on firms in a single industry over a 7-year period, it is possible 
that the results reflect some factors specific to the industry, geographic region, or period 
under study. Future replications of this study in other settings are needed to address this 
possibility.  
Second, the present study focuses only on those competitive actions which can be 
traced and identified using structured content analysis. As discussed in Chapter V, I 
deemed Automotive News a reliable source for studying competitive actions of global 
automakers. Nevertheless, and despite the extensive checks I made, Automotive News may 
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miss very subtle actions or consider some subtle actions not important enough to report. 
Moreover, this research investigates only the characteristics of competitive actions which 
can be inferred from Automotive News. The advantage of this emphasis on a single 
secondary source is its objectivity and replicability. However, this objective might have 
been achieved at the expense of some other equally important but difficult-to-measure 
characteristics, such as radicality, credibility and imitability.  
 Third, although this study provides evidence that important organizational and 
environmental characteristics influence an MNE’s competitive behavior in predictable 
ways, the performance consequence of multinational firms’ competitive actions remains 
untested. Do firms engaging in more competitive actions across countries achieve greater 
success and enhance their survival prospects? How will a firm’s past performance affect 
its willingness and capability to compete? Answers to these questions certainly will help 
specify more fully why multinational firms compete differently in the marketplace and 
how their competitive behavior can shape strategic superiority and industry evolution.  
 Fourth, although I found substantial support for most of my hypotheses, I have no 
way of knowing the specific intent behind any action studied in this research. Subsequent 
research could adopt the “social construction of rivalry” view (Porac & Thomas, 1990) as 
a means of identifying a firm’s intended rival and examining the intended effects of 
competitive action by including subjective measures of the competitive importance or 
magnitude of different kinds of actions.  
 Finally, the use of single measures for all the variables is another limitation of this 
research. For instance, the present study uses the total number of different types of actions 
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undertaken by a firm to measure its action complexity. In fact, many alternative measures 
for the same construct can be found in the literature. Miller and Chen (1996) used three 
related indexes to measure competitive simplicity: a range or “R” index ( the one I used in 
this study), a concentration or “C” index which assesses a firm’s emphasis on those most 
commonly employed types of actions, and a dominance or “D” index which assesses a 
firm’s emphasis on one single most common type of action. Although the data to construct 
many of the alternative measures for the variables included in my study  are not available 
at this time, it will be worthwhile for future scholars to consider these measures when they 
conduct similar research on global competition. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS     
This dissertation offers several directions for future research. First, the present 
study examines how subsidiary control, MNE size, national culture, government 
regulation and multimarket contact influence an MNE’s competitive aggressiveness. A 
fruitful extension of the theoretical model developed in Chapter III is to explore the impact 
of other factors on multinational rivalry. For example, numerous studies have shown that 
the demographic characteristics of top management teams (TMTs) might greatly 
influence a variety of organizational outcomes (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick, 
Cho, & Chen, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Researchers have found that TMT 
international experience is a significant predictor of multinational firms’ choice of entry 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Delios & Beamish, 1999) and chances of survival in a 
foreign market (Li, 1995; Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Generally, managers with more 
international experience tend to have less difficulty integrating in the local culture and 
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developing capabilities more suited to the host environment (Delios & Henisz, 2000). As a 
result, they will be more capable and willing to undertake aggressive competitive actions 
against their rivals.  
In addition to TMT international experience, the type of global strategy that an 
MNE chooses to pursue is also likely to affect its competitive behavior. From a strategic 
point of view, multinational firms differ in terms of the degree to which their strategies are 
globally integrated (Doz & Prahalad, 1984). In an MNE adopting a truly “global” strategy, 
subsidiaries act collectively; they do not independently maintain control over the 
environment. As a result, the common or shared competitive strategy of the whole MNE 
overwhelms the strategy of an individual subsidiary (Birkinshaw, Morrison, & Hulland, 
1995). By contrast, in an MNE adopting a multidomestic strategy, each subsidiary 
formulates and implements its own strategy.  Because of the desire to increase national 
responsiveness, there is no pressure on subsidiaries to make coordinated efforts in 
competing collectively across countries. 
Considering the significant role that TMT international experience and MNE 
global strategy play in multinational rivalry, it is important for future scholars to 
investigate how other contingency variables might affect the competitive actions of MNEs 
across countries.  
Furthermore there remains a great opportunity for future research to explore the 
influence of non-market strategy on multinational rivalry. To a multinational firm 
operating in diverse country markets, the environment of competition consists of two 
interrelated components: “the market environment, which includes activities that are 
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governed by markets or private agreements, and the nonmarket environment, which is 
characterized by the social, political and legal arrangements that structure firm 
interactions outside of, but in conjunction with markets” (Baron, 1997). Consistent with 
previous literature, non-market strategy refers to those activities that firms undertake to 
create a competitive environment which favors their competitive position. Non-market 
strategy can take various forms such as lobbying for government trade protection, 
developing interpersonal relationships with local officials, or being socially responsive in 
the foreign country market. 
As noted by Henisz and Delios (2001), both market strategy and non-market 
strategy can affect multinational firms’ competitive behaviors. In fact, as a source of 
efficiency, market power and legitimacy, the use of non-market strategy is critical for 
MNEs operating in a global context, in which political arbitrage and leverage 
opportunities are variegated and abundant. Therefore, to have a more complete 
understanding of competitive actions of multinationals, it is worthwhile for researchers to 
examine the determinants of MNE non-market strategy and its implications on 
multinational rivalry. 
Third, considering the scope of this research, I do not examine how the 
cooperative relationship between rivals affects their competitive interaction. Like human 
actions, a firm’s actions and strategies are rarely composed of a single characteristic. In 
practice, companies often compete and cooperate simultaneously with the same firms. As 
an under explored area, the antecedents and consequences of cooperative-competitive 
relationships between firms have attracted increasing attention from a small group of 
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scholars. For instance, taking a game theoretic approach, Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
(1996) showed how two players can use both competitive and cooperative means to 
influence their relative values with respect to shared customers and suppliers. Lado, Boyd 
and Hanlon (1997) argued that the combination of competitive and cooperative strategies 
creates a higher overall rent for a firm, which they call syncretic rent.  
In fact in the automotive industry, various types of cooperative relationships can 
be frequently found between competing firms. For instance, General Motors, Chrysler and 
Ford are tit-for-tat competitors in a number of markets. They however cooperated closely 
on a project to design a new medium-sized sedan for the 2005 model year. Moreover, 
Toyota and General Motors invested intensively to co-develop radar cruise control. 
Finally, in the equity alliance between Renault and Nissan, the French automaker bought 
37% of Nissan’s equity. As note by Hiroyuki Yoshino, the president of Honda Motor Co. 
“the (global automotive) industry is becoming one big inbred family, everybody is talking 
to everybody about everything” (Automotive News, Nov 11, 1999).  
Given the co-existence of cooperative and competitive relationships between 
multinational firms, many promising research questions can be posed for future research: 
“what kinds of competitive (or cooperative) actions are likely to elicit cooperative (or 
competitive) responses? What industry and organizational factors would explain the 
variability of competition-cooperation between firms? How would a firm manage the 
balance of competition-cooperation against a given rival?  
 In summary, the present study builds on diverse literatures to develop a framework 
for understanding multinational rivalry. As noted by Chen and Stucker (1997), global 
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competition is a dynamic phenomenon that occurs in a multinational context which is 
much more complicated than a domestic setting. Most existing competition research has 
not taken into account the important differences between domestic and global 
competition. I introduce an integrated model that explains the competitive behavior of 
MNEs at the firm level. In presenting this framework as a first step in a new direction, the 
present study hopes to improve our understanding of the factors that shape an MNE’s 
competitive aggressiveness across national markets. The empirical findings of this 
dissertation also offer intriguing directions for future research.  
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TABLE 5.1  
World Motor Vehicle Production in 2000 
(Units in Thousands) 
Manufacturer    Total 
GM      8,114 
Ford      7,206 
Toyota      5,897 
Volkswagen     5,106 
DaimlerChrysler AG    4,666 
PSA Peugeot-Citroen    2,879 
Nissan      2,698 
Fiat      2,639 
Renault     2,515 
Hyundai     2,488 
Honda      2,469 
Mitsubishi     1,613 
Suzuki      1,434 
 
World                56,431 
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TABLE 6.4 
Distribution of Competitive Actions by Country 
 
Country Name Frequency Percentage 
   
Argentina 36 0.69 
Austria 107 2.06 
Belgium 99 1.91 
Brazil 155 2.99 
Canada 16 0.31 
China 93 1.79 
France 563 10.85 
Germany 512 9.87 
India 97 1.87 
Indonesia 48 0.92 
Ireland 88 1.7 
Italy 503 9.7 
Japan 315 6.07 
Malaysia 47 0.92 
Mexico 25 0.48 
Netherlands 96 1.85 
Norway 80 1.54 
Philippines 30 0.58 
Poland 161 3.1 
Portugal 92 1.77 
Russia 199 3.83 
South Korea 45 0.87 
Spain 410 7.9 
Sweden 84 1.62 
Switzerland 116 2.24 
Thailand 96 1.85 
UK 485 9.35 
USA 590 11.37 
Total 5188 100 
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FIGURE 2.1 
An Action-and-Response Model
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FIGURE 3.1 
An Integrated Framework of Multinational Rivalry
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FIGURE 4.1 
General Research Model of Multinational Rivalry 
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FIGURE 6.1 
Distribution of Action Types in Dataset 2
 
 1. Capacity Action 
 2. Changes in Organizational structure and management systems 
 3. Improvement of distribution and after-sales service 
 4. Marketing action 
 5. Pricing action 
 6. Technology innovation  
 7. New product action 
 8. International expansion 
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Distribution of Different Types of Subsidiary Control in Dataset 2
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FIGURE 6.3 
Distribution of Competitive Actions by Firm in Dataset 2
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APPENDIX B 
Summary List of Hypotheses and Corresponding Data Sets 
Dataset Hypothesis being tested Unit of Analysis         Major Variables 
      1 H1a & H1b: strong subsidiary 
control increases action 
volume and action 
complexity  
H2a & H2b: size is positively 
related to action volume and 
negatively related to action 
complexity. 
H4a & H4b: cultural distance 
between the home and host 
markets decreases action 
volume and action 
complexity. 
H5a & H5b: Strong host 
government restriction 
decreases action volume and 
action complexity 
H7a & H7b: Home 
government restriction 
increases action volume and 
action complexity 
 
 
Firm-Country 
Market-Year 
 
    Dependent Variables 
Action Volume: total number 
of competitive actions taken 
by a firm (initiator) across all 
its competitors (target) in a 
focal market every year 
Action Complexity: total 
types of actions taken by a 
firm (initiator) across all its 
competitors (target) in a focal 
market every year 
   Independent Variables 
Subsidiary control 
Cultural distance between 
home and host markets 
Host government constraint 
Home government 
protection 
MNE size 
Controls 
Number of Subsidiaries 
MNE Age  
Market Size 
Growth rate of GDP 
GDP 
Exchange rate volatility 
Culture openness 
 
 
 171
Dataset Hypothesis being 
tested 
Unit of Analysis         Major Variables 
      2 H3a & H3b: cultural 
distance between rivals 
decreases action 
volume and action 
complexity.  
H6a & H6b: culturally 
similar rivals are 
MORE likely to reduce 
the action volume and 
action complexity 
when the host 
government restriction 
is strong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focal 
Firm-Competitor-Country 
Market-Year 
 
     Dependent 
Variables 
Action Volume: total 
number of competitive 
actions taken by a firm 
(initiator) against its 
rival (target) in a focal 
market every year. 
Action Complexity: total 
types of actions taken by 
a firm (initiator) against 
its rival (target) in a focal 
market every year. 
  Independent 
Variables 
Cultural distance 
between rivals 
Host government 
constraint 
MNE Size 
Home government 
protection 
Subsidiary control 
Firm size 
Cultural distance 
between home and host 
markets 
Controls 
Number of Subsidiaries 
MNE Age  
Market Size 
Growth rate of GDP 
GDP 
Exchange rate volatility 
Culture openness 
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Dataset Hypothesis being tested Unit of Analysis         Major Variables 
      3 H8a and H8b: the number 
of multimarket contact 
between an initiator and a 
target is negatively 
related to the initiator’s 
action volume and action 
complexity 
H9a and H9b: the 
competition reduction 
effect is weaker when the 
initiator and the target are 
from culturally similar 
countries 
Focal 
firm-Competitor-Year
    Dependent Variables 
Action Volume: total 
number of competitive 
actions taken by a firm 
(initiator) against its rival 
(target) across all markets 
every year. 
Action Complexity: total 
types of actions taken by a 
firm (initiator) against its 
rival (target) across all 
market every year. 
  Independent Variables 
Cultural distance between 
rivals 
Multimarket contact 
MNE size 
Controls 
Number of Subsidiaries 
MNE Age  
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APPENDIX C 
List of Key Words/Phrases for Searching Competitive Actions 
Key Words/Phrases 
 
against 
aggressively 
ahead of  
aimed directly at  
assault  
attack  
battle  
beat  
break up  
catch up with  
challenge  
compet  
contest  
counter  
craze  
defend  
domin  
eat away  
enhance  
escalate  
fend off  
fiercely  
fight  
head to head  
head-to-head  
heat up  
in face of   
initiative  
intensify  
invade  
keep pace with  
lead over  
neck and neck  
No.1  
outperform  
outstrip  
pull ahead  
 
 
put pressure  
race  
rekindle  
respond 
response  
retreat  
rival  
score  
snatch  
steal  
stronghold  
struggle  
stung  
surpass  
take action  
take on leadership  
target  
threaten  
top  
triumph over  
under assault  
under siege 
under the pressure of  
war
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APPENDIX E 
List of Countries Used in This Study 
Country Name Region 
Argentina South America 
Austria Western Europe 
Belgium Western Europe 
Brazil South America 
Canada North America 
China Southern and Eastern Asia 
France Western Europe 
Germany Western Europe 
India Southern and Eastern Asia 
Indonesia Southern and Eastern Asia 
Ireland Western Europe 
Italy Western Europe 
Japan Southern and Eastern Asia 
Malaysia Southern and Eastern Asia 
Mexico North America 
Netherlands Western Europe 
Norway Western Europe 
Philippines Southern and Eastern Asia 
Poland Eastern Europe 
Portugal Western Europe 
Russia Eastern Europe 
Korea Southern and Eastern Asia 
Spain Western Europe 
Sweden Western Europe 
Switzerland Western Europe 
Thailand Southern and Eastern Asia 
UK Western Europe 
USA North America 
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APPENDIX F 
Competitive Exchanges Between Sample Firms 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Fiat      Fiat - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH FI                                * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FI CH                                                            * * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Ford      Ford - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH FO *   ** *** * * ** ** ****        **    * **          *    *  *   *    *   * * * ** 
               *     **     *                * *           *    *      *        * 
                                                                       * 
 
 
                              *                                        * 
                  *         * *                **          * *  *      *             * 
FO CH     *   **  ** **   * * *        *     ****          * *  *     ***  **  **    ** ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - General Motors      General Motors - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH GM   *  * * *   *  * ** ****  * * * *  *  *****        ** *    **        *   *    *** * 
        *      *      *     * *              * *          ** *                         * 
                                                          * 
 
 
                                                   *      *   * 
      * *                   *          *  *  * *   *  *   *  ** 
GM CH * *      * *****     **  * * *   * ** ** *** ****   *****   *     **  * * *     ** * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Honda      Honda - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH HO   *     * *    **     *        * *      *  *              *      *        * *  * * 
        *       *           *                                          * 
                                                                       * 
 
 
                                                                       * 
        *                                                              *  * 
HO CH   *     *       *     *          *           *                   ** *              * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Chrysler - Hyundai      Hyundai - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH HY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HY CH                                                                      * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Mitsubishi      Mitsubishi - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH MI   *                                                       * 
        * 
 
 
 
                                                      * 
        *                                             * 
MI CH   *                                             *           * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Nissan      Nissan - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH NI                        *         *      * *                                 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NI CH *                     *          *      * *                       *     *        * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Peugeot      Peugeot - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH PE                                                                  *      * 
                                                                       * 
                                                                       * 
 
 
                                                                       * 
                                                                       * 
PE CH                                                        *         *      * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Chrysler - Renault      Renault - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH RE                       *    * 
 
 
 
 
                                          * 
                                          *                                     * 
RE CH                       *    *        *                   *                 * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Suzuki      Suzuki - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH SU         ** 
               * 
 
 
 
 
 
SU CH 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Toyota      Toyota - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH TO         ***    **     **  *    * *     ** **                                *  * * 
              ***           * 
 
 
 
 
              *                              *            *                    *   * 
TO CH *     * *  *   **     * *        *  *  * **         *       *** ***     **  **  * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chrysler - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Chrysler 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
CH VW                            *            *           *            *    * * 
                                              *           *            * 
                                              *           *            * 
 
 
                                                          *            * 
                         *                                *          * * 
VW CH *                  *       *                 *      *          * *    * * *       ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Fiat - Ford      Ford - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI FO           *  *        ** *            *  * **         *           *      **      * 
                            **                 *                        *      ** 
                            **                                          *       * 
 
 
           * *              **       *            *                             * 
           * *              **       *         * **                             * 
FO FI   *  * **    *      * **       *         * **                             *     * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - General Motors      General Motors - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI GM         * *  *        ** *      *        **   *       *                   *     ** 
                            **        *        *            *                   * 
                            **                                                  * 
 
 
           *                **              *                             *     * 
          **                **              *  *                          *  *  * 
GM FI     **   *   *        ** *  **        *  *                  *       *  *  * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - Honda      Honda - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI HO                                          *                               * 
                                               *                               * 
 
 
 
 
                                               *                  * 
HO FI                                          *                  * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - Hyundai      Hyundai - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI HY                                       * 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      * 
HY FI                                                 * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Fiat - Mitsubishi      Mitsubishi - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI MI                           *    *         *    * 
                                               * 
 
 
 
 
                                               * 
MI FI                                          * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - Nissan      Nissan - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI NI                                                       * 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  * 
NI FI                                                 *           * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - Peugeot      Peugeot - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI PE                       **       *     *        *       *     *       *    ** 
                            **                                    *            ** 
                            **                                    *             * 
 
 
                            **                                                  * 
                            **                                                  * 
PE FI                       **                                                  * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - Renault      Renault - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI RE                     * **       *     *                *     *       *     * 
                          * **                                    *             * 
                            **                                    *             * 
 
 
                           * *                                     *            * 
                           * *              *                      *            * 
RE FI                      * *             **    *   *             *            * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Fiat - Suzuki      Suzuki - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI SU  *                        *    **     * 
       *                              * 
 
 
 
                                                                 * 
                                                                 * 
SU FI                                                            *                     * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - Toyota      Toyota - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI TO                           *    *                      *                   * 
                                                                                * 
                                                                                * 
 
 
                                                                                * 
                                                             *  * *             * 
TO FI                              *                         *  * *             * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fiat - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Fiat 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FI VW         * *  *        ** *      ***   **  **          *    *     *              ** 
                            **        * *                   *          * 
                            **          *                   *          * 
 
 
           *                **                                  * 
           *                **                                  *    * 
VW FI      *       *  *     **       *                         **    *                 ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ford - General Motors      General Motors - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO GM *  *** *** *** * * *********** * * ** ********     * * * **** ** ***  **  *   **   * 
           * *    ** * * ****** * *  * * *  ** ** *        * *    * *           *    * 
           *       *       ****      * *    ** *  *        *        *           * 
 
 
       *   * *     *       ***              ** * * *   *   *      *      *  *   * 
      **   * * *  ** *     ***    **   * ** ** * * ** **   ****  **    *** **** *    * 
GM FO *** ** *** ***** * * *** *****   * ***** *********** ********   ********* * *  * *** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Ford - Honda      Honda - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO HO **  *  **   **  **   **       ** *    ** * *          *   * **   *     *       * * 
       *      *   *        *         *      *  * *                *    * 
                           *                                           * 
 
 
                                               *         *             * 
                           *                   *         *     *       * 
HO FO         *  *    *    **          *    *  *   *     *     *       *            *   ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ford - Hyundai      Hyundai - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO HY                 *                               * 
 
 
 
 
                                                * 
                                            *   * 
HY FO              *                        *   *            *          *  *          * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ford - Mitsubishi      Mitsubishi - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO MI                            *          *  * **    *  **    * 
                                            *  * **    *  ** 
                                                  *       ** 
 
 
                                                           *                * 
                                               *           *                * 
MI FO                            *             *           **               *     * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ford - Nissan      Nissan - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO NI *** *              *      *    * **   *   * *       *            *          * 
       *                 *           *  *                 * 
                                                          * 
 
 
                                     *                 * 
                                     *                 * 
NI FO *                   *** *      * *      * *      *                  * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Ford - Peugeot      Peugeot - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO PE      *  *            * *   **  *           *                *    *        * *   * 
           *               * *       *           *                *    *        *     * 
           *                 *       *                            *    *        * 
 
 
                            **                                         *        * 
                           ***                                         *        *      * 
PE FO                   *  ***   *                                     *       **      * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ford - Renault      Renault - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO RE   *  *                ** *  * *     *      *           * *  *         *   * * 
           *                 *                   *           * *  *         *   * 
           *                 *                                 *  *         *   * 
 
 
                           * *                                                  * 
                           * *                               *                  * 
RE FO                      ***      *            *   *       *            *     * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ford - Suzuki      Suzuki - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO SU                                                          *                        * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SU FO                                                            *                     ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ford - Toyota      Toyota - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO TO *   *  **    * *** * ** *      * *    ** ****       ***    **    *     *  *    * ** 
      *       *      **  *           * *    **  *         **      *    *        *    * 
                     *                 *                  **           *        * 
 
 
                          *  *         *         *         *                    * 
      *       *  *   *    *  *         * *   *   *         *           *        *  * 
TO FO *     * *  *   **   ****  ** *   ***   *  **  *  * * *   *   *  **      * *  * * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Ford - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Ford 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
FO VW      *       *     ***** *      *   * **   *           *         *  * *   *    **** 
           *       *     * ***              **   *           *         *  *           ** 
           *                **               *   *           *         *  * 
 
 
           *               ***       *       *                  *      * 
           *             * ***       *       *               *  *    * *               ** 
VW FO      *       *  *  * ****      **     **               * **    * *    *          ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
General Motors - Honda      Honda - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM HO   *     * **** **    *** * ***   ****    * *   *     ***    **    *            *  ** 
        *        *         **  *   *   *  *    *             *                       *  * 
                           *                                 * 
 
 
                           *                   *         * 
        *            *     *                   *         *    ** 
HO GM   *            **    **  *       **   *  *         * *  **                         * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
General Motors - Hyundai      Hyundai - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM HY                             *                           *   * 
                                                              * 
                                                              * 
 
 
                                                * 
                                                * 
HY GM                                           *                          * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
General Motors - Mitsubishi      Mitsubishi - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM MI   *         *         *    *             *           *                 *          * 
        *                                      *           *                 * 
                                                           * 
 
 
                                                      *    * 
      * *                                      *      *    * 
MI GM * *                        *             *      *    * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 185
 
General Motors - Nissan      Nissan - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM NI *        ** *  *   * ***    **   * **     ** **        ***                        ** 
      *         *        * **                      *          * 
                           *                       *          * 
 
 
                                     *                 * 
      *                 * **       * **                * 
NI GM *                 * **  *    * ***      * *      *       * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
General Motors - Peugeot      Peugeot - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM PE      *               ***   * *                          *           *  *  *     * 
           *               ***                                *           *  *  * 
           *               ***                                *           *     * 
 
 
                           ***                                  *               * 
                           ***                                  *               * 
PE GM                      ***   *                           *  *        *     ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
General Motors - Renault      Renault - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM RE      *   *            **   * *        *          *      *           *     *     * 
           *                **              *                 *           *     * 
           *                **              *                 *           *     * 
 
 
                           * *            *                                     * 
                         * * *            *                                     * 
RE GM         *          * ***   *  *     **         *                    *     * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
General Motors - Suzuki      Suzuki - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM SU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SU GM                                                            *                     * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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General Motors - Toyota      Toyota - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM TO **      ****** **  * *** * ***   * *  **  *  ***     * ***  **     *   *  *    *  ** 
      **         **  *   * **      *   *           *       * **              *  *    * 
                                       *           *       * **              *  * 
 
 
                           * *                             *                    * 
      *  *           *    ** *           *   *             *          *         * 
TO GM *  *  * *  *   **   ****     *   ***   *  *        * *   *   *  **        **    * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
General Motors - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - General Motors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
GM VW *   ** *  *  * *   * ***   *** **    ***         *  **                *** *       ** 
          ** *  *        * ***    *         **         *  *                  *  *       * 
           * *  *          ***               *         *  *                     *       * 
 
 
           *               ***       *       *            *     *                * 
           *               ***       *       * *          *     *                * 
VW GM *    *       *     * ****  *   **     ** *          **   ***          *    *      * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Honda - Hyundai      Hyundai - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO HY 
 
 
 
 
                                                * 
                                                *     *                    * 
HY HO              *                            **    *                    * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Honda - Mitsubishi      Mitsubishi - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO MI   *        *  * *       *                *              * 
        *                     *                * 
 
 
 
                                                                            * 
        *                     *                *                            * 
MI HO   *        *  **   *    *                **           * *   *         *  *  * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Honda - Nissan      Nissan - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO NI               * *    *  *   *    *                      *                  * *    * 
                    *      *  * 
 
 
 
                           * 
                        *  *  *         * 
NI HO *             * * *  *  *  ***   **              *   *  *            *  *  * * * * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Honda - Peugeot      Peugeot - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO PE                      *                                      *    * 
                           *                                      *    * 
                           *                                           * 
 
 
                           *                                           * 
                           *                                           * 
PE HO                      *                                           * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Honda - Renault      Renault - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO RE                       *                          *          * 
                                                       *          * 
                                                       * 
 
 
 
                * 
RE HO           *           *         *                      * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Honda - Suzuki      Suzuki - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO SU  *                       *               *       * 
                               *               *       * 
                                               *       * 
 
 
 
                                * 
SU HO                           *                                * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Honda - Toyota      Toyota - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO TO  *      * *   ***  * ** * * *    * *           * *     **       *   *        **  * 
                *   * *     * *                      * *                  *        ** 
                            *                          *                  *         * 
 
 
                                                                          * 
                *    **   *  **        *                                  *    *   * 
TO HO         * *   ***   ***** * *    * *  *  *    *         *       *   ***  *  ** * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Honda - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Honda 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HO VW                      *                           *   *  *        *                * 
                           *                           *      *        * 
                                                       *               * 
 
 
                                                                       * 
                           *                                         * * 
VW HO                      *                               *         * * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hyundai - Mitsubishi      Mitsubishi - Hyundai 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HY MI 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            * 
                                                                            * 
MI HY                                                                       * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hyundai - Nissan      Nissan - Hyundai 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HY NI                                   *                       *       *  * 
                                                                * 
 
 
 
 
 
NI HY 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Hyundai - Peugeot      Peugeot - Hyundai 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HY PE                                           * 
                                                * 
                                                * 
 
 
 
 
PE HY 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hyundai - Renault      Renault - Hyundai 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HY RE                                       *                    * 
                                            * 
 
 
 
 
 
RE HY 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hyundai - Suzuki      Suzuki - Hyundai 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HY SU                                     * *      *                          * 
                                            * 
 
 
 
 
 
SU HY                                                            *                     * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hyundai - Toyota      Toyota - Hyundai 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HY TO                       *                    *    *         **   *     *          * 
                            *                         *         *    * 
                            * 
 
 
 
                                                                     * 
TO HY                                                                * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Hyundai - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Hyundai 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
HY VW                                       *   *                * 
                                            *   * 
                                                * 
 
 
 
 
VW HY 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mitsubishi - Nissan      Nissan - Mitsubishi 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
MI NI *             **   **   *                       *       * 
      *                       *                       * 
                                                      * 
 
 
 
                              * 
NI MI               * *   *   *    *             *            *            * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mitsubishi - Peugeot      Peugeot - Mitsubishi 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
MI PE                            * 
 
 
 
 
                                                  * 
                                                  * 
PE MI                            *                * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mitsubishi - Renault      Renault - Mitsubishi 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
MI RE 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      * 
RE MI                                                 * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Mitsubishi - Suzuki      Suzuki - Mitsubishi 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
MI SU                          *                                            * 
                               *                                            * 
                                                                            * 
 
 
 
 
SU MI                                              *             * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mitsubishi - Toyota      Toyota - Mitsubishi 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
MI TO           **  *    *  * **               **     *   *** *   *         *  *  * 
                         *  * **                      *    **     *         * 
                            *                         *    *                * 
 
 
                                                           * 
                              *                            * 
TO MI            *  *         *                            *  *    * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mitsubishi - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Mitsubishi 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
MI VW 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                     * 
VW MI                                                                * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nissan - Peugeot      Peugeot - Nissan 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
NI PE                      *                                      * 
                                                                  * 
 
 
 
 
                          * 
PE NI                     **                                 * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Nissan - Renault      Renault - Nissan 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
NI RE                                 *               * 
                                      * 
 
 
 
 
 
RE NI 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nissan - Suzuki      Suzuki - Nissan 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
NI SU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SU NI 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nissan - Toyota      Toyota - Nissan 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
NI TO *   *       ***   ***** *  ***   * * *  * **   ***   *  **          *        * ** 
      *             *   * **  *  *       * *     *   **    * 
                           *             *           * 
 
 
                                         *                        * 
                          **  *        * *                        * 
TO NI *      *    * *  *  *** * * *    * * *    **          * **  *              * * ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Nissan - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Nissan 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
NI VW                     **  *      *  *              *                      *        * 
                          **         *  *              * 
                                     *                 * 
 
 
                           * 
                           * 
VW NI                      *                                                         * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Peugeot - Renault      Renault - Peugeot 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
PE RE                   *   **        *                      *  *              ** 
                            **        *                         *               * 
                            **                                  *               * 
 
 
                           * *       *                                          * 
                           * *    *  **                                         * 
RE PE                    * * *    * ***    *                              *     *        * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Peugeot - Suzuki      Suzuki - Peugeot 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
PE SU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SU PE 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Peugeot - Toyota      Toyota - Peugeot 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
PE TO                      *                                 *           *      * 
                                                                                * 
                                                                                * 
 
 
                             *                                                  * 
                             *           *                   *    *             * 
TO PE                      * *           *                   *    *   *         * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Peugeot - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Peugeot 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
PE VW                      ***    *                                    *       *       * 
                           ***                                         *               * 
                            **                                         * 
 
 
           *                **                                         * 
           *               ***                                       * *               * 
VW PE      *               ***       *                         *     * *               ** 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Renault - Suzuki      Suzuki - Renault 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
RE SU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SU RE 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Renault - Toyota      Toyota - Renault 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
RE TO           *           *              *                 *                  * 
                *                                                               * 
                                                                                * 
 
 
                             *                                                  * 
                             *           *                        *             * 
TO RE                       **  *  *     *                        *             * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Renault - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Renault 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
RE VW         *            ***   *    *    *     *   *       **    *      * 
                           ***                               *     * 
                           ***                                     * 
 
 
           *                **                                  * 
           *                **       *                       *  *    * 
VW RE      *          *     **   *   *       *               * **    *                  * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Suzuki - Toyota      Toyota - Suzuki 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
SU TO                       *   *                  * 
                            *   * 
                            * 
 
 
 
                               * 
TO SU                          * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Suzuki - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Suzuki 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
SU VW                                                                                   * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VW SU                                                                                   * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Toyota - Volkswagen      Volkswagen - Toyota 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          1995        1996        1997        1998        1999        2000        2001 
      JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND 
TO VW                     ** *  *  *   ***       * **                 * 
                          ** *           *       * *                  * 
                             *                   * * 
 
 
                           *                                    * 
                           *                                    * 
VW TO                      *        *              *            *                       * 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Note: The author would like to thank Dr. Cannella who made it possible for this chart to be 
presented in this research. Basically this chart visually presents the number of competitive actions 
taken by  each sample firm in different competitive dyads between Jan. 1995 to Dec. 2001. In each 
cell of this chart, on the first line, the names of two pairs competitors are introduced. On the second 
line the years being studied are listed. Using the first character of each month, the third line lists all 
the 84 months between Jan. 1995 and Dec. 2001. The number of competitive moves undertaken in 
each month is represented using asterisks appeared in each month column. One asterisk indicates 
one competitive move. Two asterisks indicate two competitive moves. Due to the constraint of 
space, more than 3 competitive actions are represented by three asterisks. Consider the first cell of 
this chart as an illustration. It provided information about  the competitive actions initiated by 
Chrysler (initiator) against Fiat (target) and the competitive actions initiated by Fiat (initiator) 
against Chrysler (target) from Jan. 1995 to Dec. 2001. In August 1997, Chrysler initiated one 
competitive action against Fiat. Fiat initiated one competitive attack against Chrysler in Dec. 1999 
and Feb. 2000 respectively.   
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